And now back to our regularly scheduled programming…

If whatever (B) happens actually only happens at times (t(n-1) + t(n-2) + … t (n-k)), then nothing happens at time t (i.e. ~∃x(Bx(t)). If no-thing happens at time t (i.e. ~∀x(Bx(t))), then nothing ever happens. If it is granted that "what happens at t" is B itself, then perdurantism is false. Otherwise, if there is no B, then there is no sense in speaking of parts of B.

The canonical example for (but really just "in") perdurantism qua entailment of the theory of special relativity (TSR), is a train collision, or mutatis mutandis a train passing a station. The point is supposed to be that there is no unique time in which "the train T passes the station S", rather that there are only time slices which correspond to relative observations. If so, then those observation-slices are themselves divisible into "smaller" slices, and don't exist in their own right. If it is granted that observation is instantaneous, then we're getting all Thomistic.

What is a "unique" time? There is no "singly valid" (unique) observational standpoint on perdurantism, so, by extension, there is no singly valid (unique) event. That is fallacious, however. Chalk it up to my abiding worries about woebegone simultaneity and truth-makers as a metaphysical family secret. Plus my profound dissatisfaction with perdurantist (ethical, logical, etc.) entailments.

∃ is {& exist;}
∀ is {& forall;}
↔ is {& harr;}
≡ is {& equiv;}
∴ is {& there4;}
□ is {& #9633;}
◊ is shift+alt/option v (auf 'ner deutschen Tastatur) or ◊ {& loz;}
∩ {& #x2229;} (Where members of set X are members of A both and B.)
U is… U (Where members of set X are members of either A or B.)