This is a sort of "guide" to James Ross's "argument from non-physical formality" against physicalism. It includes numerous objections and my answers to them, as well as some general thoughts on Ross's argument in contemporary philosophical work. It's a rough draft so I might tweak it now and then.
2 comments:
Good stuff! Thanks for putting this together to help make Ross's ideas a bit more accessible to laypersons like me.
In an effort to clarify them further, I would like to offer a few condensed restatements of his basic argument for consideration and comment. Here I am using the term "rational judgment" for an individual case of what Ross calls "judgmental understanding," which is how he defines "thinking" per note 2 of his paper.
First, a straightforward formal version:
A. Every rational judgment is uniquely compatible with a single formalization.
B. No wholly physical process or function of wholly physical processes is uniquely compatible with a single formalization.
C. Therefore, no rational judgment is a wholly physical process or function of wholly physical processes.
B is a universal negative, so we have the burden of demonstrating that what it denies is impossible in principle. I am looking for suggestions on how to do that clearly and forcefully.
Second, an informal version that highlights your point about "instance-exhaustion" and "variant-exclusion":
D. A rational judgment is a single abstract formalization that corresponds to a potentially infinite number of concrete instances.
E. A physical event is a single concrete instance that corresponds to a potentially infinite number of abstract formalizations.
F. Therefore, a rational judgment cannot be a physical event.
Third, a formal version prompted by some remarks on the Philosophy Forums thread about all of this:
G. No rational judgments are underdetermined.
H. All physical phenomena are underdetermined.
I. Therefore, no rational judgments are physical phenomena.
Regarding G, all thoughts (including all rational judgments) are underdetermined to an outside observer, who only has the (physical) behavior of the (allegedly) thinking thing to evaluate; but no rational judgments are underdetermined to the one thinking them, who immediately and definitively knows exactly what they are--even if their content is inconsistent with reality. In other words, the unavoidable first-person nature of the mind renders it unsuitable for investigation and explanation using the third-person methodology of science.
Thanks in advance for your feedback.
I also came up with another illustrative example for the indeterminacy of the physical.
Suppose that you encounter a device with only two buttons, labeled "J" and "N". You press "J", and nothing happens. You press "J" again, and suddenly the device spits out a small piece of paper with "J" on it. You press "N", and nothing happens. You press "N" again, and out comes "N" on a piece of paper. You press "J", then "N", and this time you get a paper with "S" on it. Pressing "N", then "J", also produces a paper with "S" on it. What is the device doing?
Without changing its physical characteristics or behavior in any way whatsoever, I can suggest at least five different (and equally viable) formalizations of what the device is "really" doing. No doubt there are infinitely many others. It all depends on what meaning we assign to the inputs and outputs--something that the device itself cannot do.
1. Assign "J"="J", "N"="N", and "S"="S". F(x,y) = x, if x=y; = "S" otherwise.
2. Assign "J"=1, "N"=2, and "S"=3. F(x,y) = x, if x=y; = x+y otherwise.
3. Assign "J"=1, "N"=2, and "S"=3. F(x,y) = x, if x=y; = x*y+1 otherwise.
4. Assign "J"=1, "N"=3, and "S"=2. F(x,y) = (x+y)/2.
5. Assign "J"="All A is B", "N"="All B is C", and "S"="All A is C". F(x,y) is a syllogism.
There is nothing inherent to the symbols "J", "N", and "S" that rules out the meanings assigned to them in 2-5 and the corresponding (incompatible) interpretations of what the device is (formally) doing; i.e., it is incompossibly indeterminate.
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