Tuesday, August 30, 2011

Oh, secular humanism, you do get on!

So I am expected to give a rational justification for my faith in God. Meanwhile, secular humanism (SH) is not expected to give a rational justification for its belief in the unique moral autonomy of humans. Paradoxically, SH takes "humanness" to be both a trivial fluke of biophysics and the one standard we can possibly have for morality, truth, goodness, etc. Further, of necessity, SH pulls this standard out of metaphysical thin air. It is a humanistic order imposed upon a mindless, mute, brute Nature, which is why there is SH in the first place. Why does faith in God need an extrinsic justification if faith in Man does not?

33 comments:

Crude said...

Even worse, you're not really expected to give a "rational justification", but a rational justification they personally approve of, with the understanding that if they disagree for any reason, then you're irrational (at least in the case of many.)

I agree about the SHs though, thin as they are on the ground.

One Brow said...

I agree the the moral autonomy and preferential position of humans under secular humanism is an arbitrarily chosen value.

However, we have empirical evidence men exist. the "faith in man" you are talking aobut is faith men can make good decisions (evidence is mixed, at best). That is a different sort of faith than faith that God exists.

Crude said...

However, we have empirical evidence men exist.

And we have empirical evidence that God exists, if we're playing that broad with evidence. And that evidence is given certain metaphysics - there are materialists who deny 'men' exist as anything other than some subjective judgment or model, or who outright deny that selves exist.

Arguably the theist is in a better position than the secular humanist. There's more evidence that some type of God exists than there is reason to believe the secular humanist position is credible.

But again, where are these secular humanists? They seem like a minority even among atheists, save for the lesser "Brights" who think being an atheist makes you a secular humanist automatically.

One Brow said...

Crude,

You think it is "playing broad with the evidence" to say that men exist, and therefore you can show God exists using that broad a notin of evidence? I think not.

The attempts to create metaphysical systems that treat each person as a conglomerate of cells, or subatomic particles, doe not change that the existence of the living organism, it's just redefinition.

Theist requires faith in the existence of God and faith in the accuracy of the transmissions of God's morality in addition to faith in the moral rectitude of God; the secular humanist requires only faith in the moral rectitude of humans. If you feel the former is a better footing, fine, and I will respectfully disagree.

What makes you think secular humanists are a smaller group? Because they don't write books?

Crude said...

You think it is "playing broad with the evidence" to say that men exist, and therefore you can show God exists using that broad a notin of evidence? I think not.

Where did I say I can "show God exists"? I said there was empirical evidence God exists if we play with evidence like that.

The attempts to create metaphysical systems that treat each person as a conglomerate of cells, or subatomic particles, doe not change that the existence of the living organism, it's just redefinition.

No, it's not. Because certain things inevitably follow given particular metaphysics, and you can get to some wild conclusions. I'm not the one saying "there are no selves" or "what counts as living is entirely subjective rather than intrinsic". That would be the materialists in question. Not every materialist out there, but I wasn't casting that broad a net.

Theist requires faith in the existence of God and faith in the accuracy of the transmissions of God's morality in addition

Nupe. No need for God to transmit anything given mere theism - hence the deists. And the faith has evidence in its favor - part of the point here.

the secular humanist requires only faith in the moral rectitude of humans. If you feel the former is a better footing, fine, and I will respectfully disagree.

"Moral rectitude of humans"? Far more complicated than that, especially if the secular humanist is a materialist, but secular humanist visions have far more evidence against them than for them. Positive evidence against the existence of God is thin on the ground. Positive evidence against secular humanist claims, particularly the quasi-utopian ones? It's there in abundance.

What makes you think secular humanists are a smaller group? Because they don't write books?

They write books. They even have clubs! Poorly attended clubs. Even in quite secular countries.

They're semi-popular in certain niche academic circles, and among the lesser "Brights" in name. Otherwise? Thin on the ground. It's not like mere irreligion tracks closely to "really wanting to hear some yutz expound on his ethical system".

One Brow said...

Crude,

I have no idea what you mean by "... there was empirical evidence God exists if we play with evidence like that." Could you offer an example?

I agree you can get wild conclusions from various matephysics, but that doesn't really alterr my opinion that it's just redifinition. Metaphysics is a formal contruction, and it's conclusions have no necessary connection to reality. We use a matephysical system we find useful, and discard one we do not find useful.

If the dictates of God is to be source of morality, then you'll need an accurate transmission method. If the attributes of God is to be the source of morality, then you'll need an accurate detecftion method. Either way, you need faith in the ability of men to perform these tasks. So, using God as a source of morality requires faith in the three things I mentioned earlier.

I agree there's not a lot of moral rectitude to be found in humans, but there seem to be no better sources.

I'm sure secular humanist meeting are not well attended, but about meetings for atheists? Are they more frequent or beter-attended? At least secular humanism has a goal. What's the goal at an atheist meeting, besides "get people to leave me alone"?

Crude said...

One Brow,

I have no idea what you mean by "... there was empirical evidence God exists if we play with evidence like that." Could you offer an example?

Of what? Playing with evidence, or empirical evidence that a God/gods exist?

If the dictates of God

I haven't offered up "the dictates of God" as a comparison point here. It's been the existence of God/gods. You said we have empirical evidence men exist - I said we have empirical evidence God/gods exist, and it's in vastly better shape than evidence for the secular claims. And the same metaphysical questioning that can get applied to God actually works for man pretty well too.

As for their being no better sources, I disagree of course, but that's not the comparison I was making anyway.

I'm sure secular humanist meeting are not well attended, but about meetings for atheists?

Apparently, not exactly spectacular. My personal estimation is that the Cult of Gnu's primary effect on the debate has been 'Atheism has marginally increased their numbers among the stupid and loud' and 'People now realize you don't have to be religious to be a loud, obnoxious pain in the ass'.

But I'll bet you the Cult of Gnu even now fills more seats than the secular humanists.

What's the goal at an atheist meeting, besides "get people to leave me alone"?

A two hour hate, a circlejerk, and I assume there's some free food. Plus I hear that one out of every fifty of them is a single woman - be sure to check the elevators!

At least secular humanism has a goal.

Say what you want about the tenets of national socialism, dude, at least it's an ethos.

One Brow said...

Crude said...
Of what? Playing with evidence, or empirical evidence that a God/gods exist?

I mean the connection between the two, but if yo uhave the second, that would be good to.

I haven't offered up "the dictates of God" as a comparison point here. It's been the existence of God/gods. You said we have empirical evidence men exist - I said we have empirical evidence God/gods exist, and it's in vastly better shape than evidence for the secular claims.

Then, I can't help but think you are comparing apples (existence) to oranges (qualifications for determining a correct morality).

I didn't much else worth responding to.

Michael Turton said...

Great discussion. If only it described a secular humanism that anyone actually subscribed to.

Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...

Or got a true Scotsman right.

Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...

One Brow:

Crude made one of my points for me in advance by noting the vacuity of "pointing to" humans as the guide for morality, either because True-Humanness is as mystical a splendor as the divine being, or because each case of an upright man already begs the question "in virtue of what is he upright?" (Not to mention that the finer the empirical precision of a "case study" in ethics based on this and that 'actual' person, the less applicable and more theoretical the precept would become. If doing the right thing is to be read off of empirical cases of 'actual' people, then I must be those same actual people in order to fulfill the precept under study.)

One Brow said...

Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...
Crude made one of my points for me in advance by noting the vacuity of "pointing to" humans as the guide for morality, either because True-Humanness is as mystical a splendor as the divine being, or because each case of an upright man already begs the question "in virtue of what is he upright?"

You are correct here, or at least I am in agreement here. There are many different inherent difficulties in trusting humans to determine morals, and I have neither solutions nor assurances that the difficulties are resolvable.

However, from my perspective, there are no other sources to consult. Even if we go to the step where we accept the existence of God and accept Their moral authority, we must still rely on humans for the proper interpretation of that moral aunthority, whether it is our own human self or other humans. Until I receive direct advice from angels, I have to rely on the thoughts of humans.

Crude said...

I didn't much else worth responding to.

Hey, you asked just what they do at their meetings. ;)

Then, I can't help but think you are comparing apples (existence) to oranges (qualifications for determining a correct morality).

You made the comparison, not me. Shoulda been more careful of those apples.

I mean the connection between the two, but if yo uhave the second, that would be good to.

Still not sure what you're not clear on here. That people play games with what does and does not count as 'evidence', even 'empirical evidence'? I guess you can say you've never seen people engage in inventive redefinitions of these things, but I'm skeptical.

In fact...

However, from my perspective, there are no other sources to consult.

You're doing it here.

Secular humanism isn't merely 'determining morality and the thoughts of men are involved', otherwise Aquinas was a secular humanist. No, if you grant God and God's moral authority, you thereby have another source - and certainly you broaden the scope of your inquiries. That humans are involved doesn't make it all 'man-made', anymore than natural theology reduces to 'all oughts are decided by men' just because, barring miracles, humans write books on natural theology.

Not to mention, you say 'there are no other sources to consult'. But who says there's supposed to be a source anyway? Nihilism's a live option, isn't it? Assume materialism and atheism, and you don't automatically get the truth of "secular humanism" - joke that it is - falling out of such a situation. Though some people really seem to think that.

One Brow said...

Crude said...
You made the comparison, not me.

Actually, the comparison between faith that God exists and faith that men can make moral decisions rests in the original post, and I reponded to it.

I guess you can say you've never seen people engage in inventive redefinitions of these things, but I'm skeptical.

I'm trying to learn about you, not necessarily people generally, and what examples you accept.

You're doing it here.

How am I playing with evidence here?

Secular humanism isn't merely 'determining morality and the thoughts of men are involved', otherwise Aquinas was a secular humanist. No, if you grant God and God's moral authority, you thereby have another source - and certainly you broaden the scope of your inquiries.


From the evidence I have seen, there is no reason to say the source of morality for Aquinas was different than the source for any secular humanist. After all, even if God existed, you would still need evidence that Aquinas, or anyone else, was able to access the morals preferences of such a Being, which is an act of faith in addition to the faith God exists.

Not to mention, you say 'there are no other sources to consult'. But who says there's supposed to be a source anyway? Nihilism's a live option, isn't it?

Since we are discussing those who want to have moral codes, nihilism is not a live option for them.

Crude said...

How am I playing with evidence here?

I illustrated that with the quoted response and my reply to it. I'll add further.

From the evidence I have seen, there is no reason to say the source of morality for Aquinas was different than the source for any secular humanist. After all, even if God existed, you would still need evidence that Aquinas, or anyone else, was able to access the morals preferences of such a Being, which is an act of faith in addition to the faith God exists.

This is just a convoluted and cutesy way of saying that you reject Aquinas' arguments and think them false. Further, even if there were evidence you accepted, or arguments you accepted, that pointed to Aquinas deriving morality from God, God's moral authority, or some non-material thing (nature, etc), it would still 'involve the thoughts of men' at some point, and my comparison - and complaint - would stand.

Like I said, if you want to make 'secular morality' so loose as to wrap up Aquinas in it, be my guest. I think that's enough to illustrate the twisting you're engaging in.

Since we are discussing those who want to have moral codes, nihilism is not a live option for them.

I want a Ferrari. "Not having a Ferrari" is a live option, whether I like it or not. Likewise, nihilism is a live option whether or not people 'want a moral code'. And merely coming up with a set of rules they intend to follow doesn't thereby falsify nihilism.

You may as well just say, 'Some people want God to exist, so atheism is not a live option for them. Therefore there's no other sources than God to consult.'

One Brow said...

This is just a convoluted and cutesy way of saying that you reject Aquinas' arguments and think them false.

No, it's an added difficulty for those who wish to demonstrate Aquinas' position as useful and reliable. Aquinas' metaphysical arguments can no more be false than any other metaphysical arguments.

... it would still 'involve the thoughts of men' at some point, and my comparison - and complaint - would stand.

Actually, that's been my point (that it would still involve the thoughts of men), so now I'm really have no idea what your comparison and complaint is meant to demonstrate.

Likewise, nihilism is a live option whether or not people 'want a moral code'.

If they want a moral code, they can adopt one.

And merely coming up with a set of rules they intend to follow doesn't thereby falsify nihilism.

Of course not, because nihilism, like any other philosophical position, is a formal positon, and not subject to falsification. To think otherwise is a category error. Nihilism is either useful or not in describing the world. For those who desire a moral code, it is not useful.

Crude said...

No, it's an added difficulty for those who wish to demonstrate Aquinas' position as useful and reliable. Aquinas' metaphysical arguments can no more be false than any other metaphysical arguments.

It's not an 'added difficulty', except insofar as pointing out the limitations and requirements of metaphysics in general.

Actually, that's been my point (that it would still involve the thoughts of men), so now I'm really have no idea what your comparison and complaint is meant to demonstrate.

That it's ridiculous to equate 'secular humanism' with 'any system that involves human thought at any point in the chain'. But hey, play with definitions if you want. Go further and note that theocracies are really secular states.

If they want a moral code, they can adopt one.

Nihilists? Sure, so long as we define "moral code" to be compatible with nihilism. Or vice versa. Very Alice in Wonderland.

Nihilism is either useful or not in describing the world. For those who desire a moral code, it is not useful.

Where's my Ferrari? It's not an option for me not to have one. It is "not useful" for me not to have a Ferrari. Apparently, that's all it takes.

One Brow said...

Crude said...
It's not an 'added difficulty', except insofar as pointing out the limitations and requirements of metaphysics in general.

I agree it is an added difficulty in precisely that manner.

That it's ridiculous to equate 'secular humanism' with 'any system that involves human thought at any point in the chain'.

I agree with that point.

One Brow: Nihilism is either useful or not in describing the world. For those who desire a moral code, it is not useful.

Where's my Ferrari? It's not an option for me not to have one. It is "not useful" for me not to have a Ferrari. Apparently, that's all it takes.


Assuming you are talking about the car, a Ferrari is a physical object; a moral code is a formal construct. Physical objects generally often a price attached if they are available at all; formal construct are free to any who possess sufficient wit to understand them.

Crude said...

Assuming you are talking about the car, a Ferrari is a physical object; a moral code is a formal construct. Physical objects generally often a price attached if they are available at all; formal construct are free to any who possess sufficient wit to understand them.

I get the impression that you think moral nihilists can't come up with codes if they so choose, or that secular humanists are concerned only with finding some manner of code, rather than some version of moral realism. I think you're clearly mistaken.

One Brow said...

I don't know why you get that impression. I have tried to emphasize that the decision to choose a moral code is the major significant obstacle for a nihilist (if a person lacks suffcient wit to understand a moral code, can they still have sufficient wit to be a nihilist?). I'm sure there are humanists who believe in some sort of moral realism, and humanists who do not.

Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...

I am loathe to accede to my first gut impression, but comments One Brow made in his discussion with djr some weeks ago have given tipped the scale for me. One Brow thinks rationality is radically revisable and merely a formal device (though how you could get to that conclusion without some rational fundamentals is beyond me), so I'm unconvinced he's worth arguing with.

In any event, as far as the whole "everything is secular since humans are involved" gambit, I dedicate this link to him: http://veniaminov.blogspot.com/2009/03/when-arguments-attack.html

Sorry I'm so spotty around here. New marriage, new semester, relatives newly living in Taiwan, busy!

Best,

One Brow said...

The rationality page of OneLook offers two ideas:

▸ noun: the quality of being consistent with or based on logic
▸ noun: the state of having good sense and sound judgment

I don't know which of these you mean, but I see them as being separate things. I would agree the first sort of rationality is merely a formal device, the latter is not.

djr said...

How could good sense and sound judgment be logically inconsistent?

Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...

One Brow:

I'm talking about the idea of "one logic to rule them all."

I am very interested in formal logic and logical philosophy, but I am also aware of how pedantic the whole field is. Polyvalnet logics and syllogistic logics, and so on. The alleged overthrow of classical logic by the invention of post-classical logics is a farce, since the decision how and when to "toggle" between different logics is itself based on classical logic. Even the admission of conflict between classical logic and non-classical logic is itself a classical device, namely, the excluded middle. Reaching the conclusion that logic is infinitely revisable and tentative is itself a conclusion reached by an unrevised and absolute logic, namely, a plain old syllogism. If A-logic is revisable and only formally useful, then A-logic is not sound. B-logic shows the revisability of A-logic, therefore A-logic is not sound. That whole skit, however, relies on straight modus tollens, so syllogism still reigns even among its detractors.

One Brow said...

djr,

The types of things you exhibit good sense and sound judgement upon may not be in the domain of logic at all. If you are reading height measurements of humans, and one height say 1600 cm, it is good senswe and sound judgement to have the height remeasured, but that's based on experience with human heights, not on a logical argument.

Although, I suppose you could say anything not self-contradictory is consistent with logic, I presume rational means just a little more than that, to the point where accepting the human height of 1600 cm is not reational, even though it is logically consistent.

One Brow said...

Even the admission of conflict between classical logic and non-classical logic is itself a classical device, namely, the excluded middle.

I was never introduced to the notion of conflict bgetween logical systems. Instead, it was a matter of what you could say in one that you could not say in the other. For example, some proofs in the predicate calculus have no expression in the syllogistic calculus. That is not a conflict, nay more than a hammer with a claw is in conflict with a hammer with a ball head. If a logical system is a good deswcription of the inferences you feel you should make, use it. If you want to include the inferences in the predicate calculus not available to syllogisms, use the predicate calculus. If you wish to exclude them, use the syllogisms.

Reaching the conclusion that logic is infinitely revisable and tentative is itself a conclusion reached by an unrevised and absolute logic, namely, a plain old syllogism. If A-logic is revisable and only formally useful, then A-logic is not sound.

A logic is never sound. Logics can only produce valid statement5s based on premises. Even showing a premise invalid does not necessaily make that premise unsound; it may be valid in another logical system.

Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...

One Brow:

Is your above argumentation sound?

If so, how can it be so based on unsound logic (which, for you, is pleonasm)?

If not, why mount the argument?

One Brow said...

Is my above post technically an argument?

"Unsound logic", in reference of a logic, is not a pleonasm. To say a logic is unsound is the equivalent of calling a sound dry, since sounds are not wet. Soundness refers to the result of combining a useful logic with valid axioms.

More constructively, I was not offering an argument, but commenting on the nature of logic itself.

Let me ask you this: do you think you can construct a sound logical argument proving calssical logic is superior to other forms of logic?

Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...

My point is that any attempt to show the inferiority of classical sentential logic (CSL) itself employs sentential reasoning. I grant that CSL can be and has been augmented and enriched by temporal, modal, and conditional logical developments, but once you get to what John Burgess calls "relevantistic" logics, which deny disjunctive conclusions, allegedly on the grounds that such relevantistic nuances fix the error of CSL, you have jumped the shark. For the only way to mount such claims against CSL as the bedrock of logic, is eo ipso to invoke CSL.

Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...

Also, while there is always a temporal logic translation for CSL logic, and predicate logic has greater expressive power than CSL, yet CSL can accommodate temporal lemmas and CSL is decidable, whereas as predicate logic is not. Again, I agree that the dialectical context is important in modulating "which" logic we use, but any logic that violates CSL is in trouble. If logic is infinitely revisable and negotiable, and reason rests on logic, then reason is ultimately useless. It comes down to postmodern persuasion at that point.

One Brow said...

Codgitator (Cadgertator),

It seems to me you are looking for an unshakeable foundation on which to set reason. CSL is as good a choice as any other for that, and I will not try to persuade you otherwise.

However, I see CSL as one of many different choices for reasoning. I don't think that makes reasoning useless. It just means you have to agree on the rules of reasoning beforehand. Again, I don't wsee the logic as conflicting, they are either useful or not. Choosing a different logic is not going against CSL.

Again, for me the emphasis is on usability. If the logic sufficient to deal with the propositions involved and reach the conclusions needed? The wikipedia article list a few applicaitons where classical logic seems to have been a poor fit for a real-world usages. When an artificial intelligence coder or electrician uses a paraconsistent logic, have they jumped the shark? Is their work merely postmodern persuasion?

Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...

One Brow:

I'll stick to three bullet points, so my thoughts don't meander.

1) One of my key points is that, even the thesis that rationality is indefinitely revisable (i.e. bottomless) relies on some fundamental logical principles. Namely, that A is different from non-A, that revising essentials of A makes it non-A, that revising in favor of non-A entails rejecting A, etc. At the very least your revisability thesis of logic (RTL) includes the non-negotiable axiom that we must agree on our axioms. And if I don't agree? Am I really being irrational? Or just different? RTL is just a plain case of modus ponens––If CSL can be revised, it is not absolute; if CSL is not absolute, logic per se is indefinitely revisable; therefore RTL is true––and so only ends up vindicating CSL in the very act of defying it.

2) It is precisely because machines can use inconsistent and paraconsistent logics that they are not rational. Even human users are merely simulating their illogic, as an analogue of basic logic (cf. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, ch. 7), and still retain their grasp of basic logic from the "outside". I assert further that no purely physical system is formally definite, but some processes of logic and reason in humans are formally definite, therefore humans are not purely physical systems. Not only are humans incapable of acting based on paraconsistent logic, but the recognized inconsistency between various logics itself is a recognition of the abiding validity of basic logical rules (e.g. excluded middle).

3) If it's just a matter of presenting some axioms and seeing who will agree with us, then Christianity has among its axioms that "God was made incarnate in Jesus Christ for the redemption of mankind." Getting others to agree is what's traditionally known as evangelism. If you reject that core axiom, you do so for some reason, i.e., based on some other set of axioms, and therefore you expect me to act in accordance with reason. But if there is no such thing as reason per se, then there is no basis on which we can agree, and, further, no basis on which you can reject the Christian axioms. The fact that you do reject them, just means you are an irrational nonbeliever, which is your problem, not mine. You see?

Best,

One Brow said...

Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...
1) One of my key points is that, even the thesis that rationality is indefinitely revisable (i.e. bottomless) relies on some fundamental logical principles. Namely, that A is different from non-A, ...

Is logic the source, or the most common means of expression among humans, for these principles?

On a very basic level, any herd animal recognizes that a predator is different from a non-predator, a herd member is different from a non-herd member. Humans take this and are able to strip away the particulars of "herd" and "predator", and so discuss "A" versus "not-A". But we didn't get the concept from logic, unless you are positing that deer engage in logic. Logic is what we create to discuss the concepts.

So, I think I am half-agreeing with you. I agree that we have some very fundamental principles we include as the basis for logic. I disagree regarding the source of those principles.

And if I don't agree? Am I really being irrational? Or just different?

Then we won't be able to work in the same formal system together.

therefore RTL is true

I'm not sure true/false form valid categories for a statement like RTL.

Even human users are merely simulating their illogic, as an analogue of basic logic ...

To an extent, I agree with you here, as well. Our usage of a simple black/white classification is inherent.

I assert further that no purely physical system is formally definite, but some processes of logic and reason in humans are formally definite, therefore humans are not purely physical systems. Not only are humans incapable of acting based on paraconsistent logic, but the recognized inconsistency between various logics itself is a recognition of the abiding validity of basic logical rules (e.g. excluded middle).

That's a strong statement. I'd venture my wife's parents attitude toward me is paraconsistent, in that I seem to be both an important member of the family and not a member of the family at all, often at the same time.

More seriously, the very notion that philosphers consistently emphasize the manner, place, time nature of contradictory statements is because we are actually pretty comfortable in thinking non-rigorously that something can be both true in a sense and false in a sense.

If you reject that core axiom, you do so for some reason, i.e., based on some other set of axioms, and therefore you expect me to act in accordance with reason.

I don't think axioms are selected in accordance with reason. They are more often selected based on intuitive leaps or deep personal convictions.

The fact that you do reject them, just means you are an irrational nonbeliever, which is your problem, not mine. You see?

I see and agree with it, except for why it is my problem, as opposed to my inescapable state. I make no claim to superior rationality compared to you.