EVERY year at this time the Pope addresses the Vatican diplomatic corps and wherever possible the media like to misinterpret what he says.
Two years ago he is supposed to have compared the destruction of the rainforests with homosexuality, but he didn't even mention homosexuality in that speech.
This year he is supposed to have blamed the sex abuse scandals on the 1970s and to have suggested that we didn't really know child sex abuse was an absolute evil back then.
The reporting this time was a little closer to the truth, but not by much because it gave the false impression that what he had to say was utterly ridiculous and unworthy of consideration.
In fact, in the 1970s there was a movement to legalise sex between children and adults and it was supported by some of the leading lights of the time who believed sexual relationships of this sort weren't evil at all, let alone an absolute evil.
This had been conveniently forgotten until the German magazine, 'Der Spiegel' (itself on the left) reminded us of the fact in an article a few months ago entitled 'The sexual revolution and children: how the left took things too far.'
The article describes the kinderladen movement in Germany set up by leftists in the 1970s as a rival to the kindergarten movement. Its intention was to radicalise very young children, and to 'sexually liberate' them.
'Der Spiegel' describes what this involved: "The educators' notes indicate that they placed a very strong emphasis on sex education. Almost every day, the students played games that involved taking off their clothes, reading porno magazines and pantomiming intercourse."
In addition, the children were encouraged to fondle each other and to fondle adults.
Today, we recognise this as child abuse. But clearly the parents who sent their children to these schools did not consider it as such and neither did the teachers.
How did they justify this? As 'Der Spiegel' makes clear, they believed they were 'liberating' children from 'repressive' and 'bourgeois' notions about child sexuality.
This is what the Pope meant when he told the diplomatic corps: "In the 1970s, paedophilia was theorised as something fully in conformity with man and even with children."
… 'Der Spiegel' also reminds us that, as late as 1985, the Greens' state organisation in the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia argued that "nonviolent sexuality' between children and adults should generally be allowed, without any age restrictions". …
What about Jean-Paul Sartre? Is this doyen of leftist philosophers also to be dismissed as unrepresentative of intellectual currents in the 1970s?
In 1977, he and 69 other French leading lights wrote a letter to newspaper 'Le Monde' in which they demanded the release of three men accused of having sex with minors.
It doesn't stop there. In the 1970s a pro-paedophile organisation called the Paedophile Information Exchange was a member of the British Council for Civil Liberties.
The North American Man-Boy Love Association was a member of one of the biggest gay rights movements in the world -- the International Lesbian and Gay Association -- right up until 1993.
This attitude -- ranging from ambivalence towards child/adult sex to outright support -- still continues. Think of those who defended the film director Roman Polanski, among them other famous directors, actors as well as French government ministers.
I cite this story not only because truth deserves a hearing whenever possible, but also to put in perspective a recent exchange I had at another blog:
ME: …if you premise your position by denying anything at all is objectively evil, you also have no grounds for defending anything at all as objectively good, including fairness, respect, etc.
INTERLOCUTOR: A bitter pill to swallow, but good medicine nonetheless.
ME: Do you recognize that torturing infants is always and everywhere wrong? If so, this is because you implicitly recognize that doing the opposite of torture to infants—loving, nourishing, protecting, teaching, etc.—is always and everywhere good for infants.
INT: My implicit recognition of this is still subjective, not objective. That certain responses are hard-wired into our brains does not make those responses objective, it makes them reliable and near-universal.
ME: If you refuse to defend even those essential goods as objective goods, then your position is self-refuting in terms of its own goals and morally vicious for condoning behavior like Vlad’s as morally acceptable.
INT: I see many claims that, sans objective morality, no one has the right to say something else is immoral. What I don't see is a solid basis upon which such claims rest. Rather, they come off as rhetoric from people trying to use the fallacious reasoning from undesired consequences.
ME: ... is marriage between a father and his daughter also acceptable to you? If not, why not?
INT: Fathers and daughters, even brothers and sisters, do not have an equitable standing before any putative romantic relationship.
Regardless how open-minded, unsentimental, rational, and so on, my interlocutor believes his statutory relativism to be, it is itself a naive form of Romantic idealism––which is to say, dogmatism with satin gloves. The best argument against such relativism is not about "slippery slopes", but, as I noted in the exchange above, that it is simply incoherent. For if nothing is really wrong, then nothing is really right; and if nothing is really right, then the State has no right to impose its views on right and wrong. If the key tactic in a moral system is to deny that anything at all is objectively evil, then adherents of that morality eo ipso have no grounds for defending anything at all as objectively good, including fairness, respect, etc. Do we not recognize that torturing infants is always and everywhere wrong? If so, this is because we implicitly recognize that doing the opposite of torture to infants—loving, nourishing, protecting, teaching, etc.—is always and everywhere good for infants. And there’s objective morality, entrenched at the core of allegedly relativist morality. If the relativist refuses to defend even those essential ends as objective goods, then his position is self-refuting in terms of its own goals and morally vicious for condoning behavior like Vlad’s as morally acceptable. A morality that would condone the torture of infants in the name of a higher principle like "open-mindedness" morally disqualifies itself.
Hence, it is a red herring to dismiss anti-gay-marriage arguments as "slippery slope" arguments, since any argument can be so construed. Consider my interlocutor's penultimate remark:
I see many claims that, sans objective morality, no one has the right to say something else is immoral. What I don't see is a solid basis upon which such claims rest. Rather, they come off as rhetoric from people trying to use the fallacious reasoning from undesired consequences.
As much as he disdains arguing from "undesired consequences," his own position is rife with such logic, since, for him, among the most undesirable consequences he can foresee are the imposition of religious absolutism and the decline of fairness, respect, and the like. All moral arguments are advanced in favor of something, and therefore all rebuttals to opposing moral standpoints amount to "slippery slope" arguments, in so far as all moral arguments strive to avoid the principled loss, and then progressive loss, of a favored good or favored goods.
18 comments:
For if nothing is really wrong, then nothing is really right; and if nothing is really right, then the State has no right to impose its views on right and wrong.
Is it your position that all laws must be based on what is really right or really wrong? For example, can you give a "really right" marginal percentage of income for a person earning $50,000/year after deductions? If you don't hold that those laws need such a basis, than why do laws against child molestatino need one?
If the key tactic in a moral system is to deny that anything at all is objectively evil, then adherents of that morality eo ipso have no grounds for defending anything at all as objectively good, including fairness, respect, etc.
Thus, we recognize that we must defend goods on subjective grounds, just as objective goods are chosen on subjective grounds to begin with with in natural law. The determination of purpose is inherently subjective.
Do we not recognize that torturing infants is always and everywhere wrong? If so, this is because we implicitly recognize that doing the opposite of torture to infants—loving, nourishing, protecting, teaching, etc.—is always and everywhere good for infants.
Are you lcaiming subjective determinations can not be universal? That seems a strange thing to say.
A morality that would condone the torture of infants in the name of a higher principle like "open-mindedness" morally disqualifies itself.
Pure sophistry. You know very well I condemn such behavior. Rhetoric that my condemnation is a condonation is conducive only to inflaming passions, not improving understanding.
I love the throw-in to the one major homosexual organization that delayed expelling NAMBLA. That's not very relevant to the church's behavior, from what I can tell. Could you explain why they are linked?
By the way, you can feel free to call me One Brow. This whole "INTERLOCUTOR" things seems pretty silly.
As much as he disdains arguing from "undesired consequences," his own position is rife with such logic, since, for him, among the most undesirable consequences he can foresee are the imposition of religious absolutism and the decline of fairness, respect, and the like.
I can see far worse consequences that that.
More to the point, I fully acknowledge that my appeal to adverse consequences is based on a subjective distaste for adverse consequences. You are arguing for an ojective standard based on a subjective distast for adverse consequences. You don't see a clear distinction there?
Is it your position that all laws must be based on what is really right or really wrong? For example, can you give a "really right" marginal percentage of income for a person earning $50,000/year after deductions? If you don't hold that those laws need such a basis, than why do laws against child molestatino need one?
You're confusing an ability to pass laws that perfectly promote a given good with an ability to pass laws that imperfectly promote a given good. It's like arguing that, because we can't exactly determine with utter certainty whether a penalty of X many years in prison for child molestation is the absolute, most just move, that no laws against child molestation can be passed with the motivation of 'because it's really wrong'. It's simply not the case.
The determination of purpose is inherently subjective.
Not in any interesting sense. Are you taking the tack that all scientific discovery is subjective because an individual is necessarily involved with everything from the observations to coming up with theories?
Are you lcaiming subjective determinations can not be universal?
If a given subjective determination was universal, what need would there be for such laws? "Let's pass a law against something absolutely no one will do"?
Pure sophistry. You know very well I condemn such behavior.
No, you'd reject it for yourself, but all "condemnation" means and can ever mean on a purely subjective scheme is 'I/We don't like that, at this particular moment.' It isn't 'really wrong', because there is no such thing as being 'really wrong'. When condemnation means "You didn't actually do anything wrong, but damnit, I don't like it at this moment!", condemnation has lost its relevant meaning.
The condoning is built into the view.
It's like arguing that, because we can't exactly determine with utter certainty ..., that no laws against child molestation can be passed with the motivation of 'because it's really wrong'.
Who makes that argument, besides pedophiles and theists beating up straw men?
Are you taking the tack that all scientific discovery is subjective ...
Science deals with functions at times (what things do), but not with purposes (what things are supposed to do).
If a given subjective determination was universal, what need would there be for such laws? "Let's pass a law against something absolutely no one will do"?
Sometimes people do things they know are wrong.
No, you'd reject it for yourself, but all "condemnation" means and can ever mean on a purely subjective scheme is 'I/We don't like that, at this particular moment.' It isn't 'really wrong', because there is no such thing as being 'really wrong'.
Again, sophistry. You'll need to provide an actual case that "subjective" means "intermediate", as opposed to merely "arbitrary".
Who makes that argument, besides pedophiles and theists beating up straw men?
I was highlighting a flaw with your sophistry. Nothing more.
Science deals with functions at times (what things do), but not with purposes (what things are supposed to do).
And yet 'what things do' is discovered subjectively. But I'm glad to see you affirm that science is incapable of determining purpose one way or the other.
Sometimes people do things they know are wrong.
So, you subjectively know that anyone who does act X 'knows that it is wrong', even though the only kind of 'wrong' that exists on your count is that which is subjectively judged to be so?
I'm conversing with The Watcher!
You'll need to provide an actual case that "subjective" means "intermediate", as opposed to merely "arbitrary".
It's not 'sophistry' to highlight what naturally falls out of a position. You, meanwhile, are making the interesting move of suggesting that some acts are universally judged as 'wrong' subjectively, and that people who engage in them think it's wrong too - apparently, even if they insist that they don't think they did anything wrong, we should consider them to be lying.
I think I'll match your sophistry (is that your favorite word lately, due to it being slapped on you a few times) with some additional: There are no atheists, and everyone believes in God by nature. But some people are acting out against God and pretending they don't believe.
Hey, being The Watcher is fun. ;)
OB: Is it your position that all laws must be based on what is really right or really wrong? For example, can you give a "really right" marginal percentage of income….
C: Yet, presumably, tax evasion and perjury are based on moral rather than merely fiscal considerations. Not ever law is derived from moral truth, nor is every moral truth enshrined in positive law, but this does not mean the two classes cannot overlap. We do in fact legislate morality qua a standard for legal policy and not vice versa.
OB: You know very well I condemn such behavior. Rhetoric that my condemnation is a condonation is conducive only to inflaming passions, not improving understanding.
C: Oh, I know you object to it verbally, but I also know, by your own confession, that your squeamishness, and mine, is just a hard-wired accident, not an abiding moral principle, and therefore not germane to the moral judgment of torturing infants. You have no grounds for your own moral strictures. My cat doesn't like strangers, but that's hardly relevant to their moral standing. In your logic, we have biological inclinations to dislike torturing infants, but to see any moral relevance in that is "merely subjective," as you like to say. Crude has already pointed out the same deficiency in your reasoning.
…
OB: I love the throw-in to the one major homosexual organization that delayed expelling NAMBLA. That's not very relevant to the church's behavior, from what I can tell. Could you explain why they are linked?
The article is demonstrating that, contrary to media spin, the Pope was correct to say that in the 1970s child sex was endorsed by otherwise mainstream psychologists/educators. The article buttresses his accuracy by noting how pro-paedophilia thinking was hip even into the 1990s under the aegis of NAMBLA and LGBT. The relevance of those facts to the Church's behavior is that some decisions about handling cases of reported clerical abuse were complicated by prudential considerations of contemporary psychiatry at the time. If even secular psychiatrists were claiming pedophiles and ephebophiles were compulsive rather than deviant, that would influence how the Church might handle the accused. Heaven forbid the Church ever beg to differ with His Eminence Science again!
OB: By the way, you can feel free to call me One Brow. This whole "INTERLOCUTOR" things seems pretty silly.
I did not provide a link to your comments, but if I had, I would name you. I often 'render' real people into “interlocutors”, mainly to encourage my objectivity.
…
OB: I can see far worse consequences that that.
C: Worse? Better? Good? Bad? Right? Wrong? One Brow, how quaint of you!
OB: More to the point, I fully acknowledge that my appeal to adverse consequences is based on a subjective distaste for adverse consequences. You are arguing for an ojective standard based on a subjective distast for adverse consequences. You don't see a clear distinction there?
C: No, I am arguing for my positions based on their truth, but I also have no qualms about noting adverse consequences of contrary views. The “slippery slope” argument against, say, gay marriage is typically deployed to reduce the opposition's argument to a worry about adverse consequences. My point here is that, even if that were true, a tu quoque nullifies the slippery-slope argument. In fact, though, slippery-slope reasoning is but one prong of the larger argument.
BTW, One Brow, have you noticed that throughout this discussion––indeed, in all your discussions––you presuppose that your interlocutor ought to argee with you, that you ought to present your points according to the truth, and that the purpose of language (spoken or written) is to convey and capture truth? IOW, you presuppose a strong view of the objective purpose and moral parameters of human reasoning. Yet these things, purpose and morality, are the very things your purposefully moral arguments strive to invalidate. Am I (are you) obliged to follow the truth where it leads? Is my mind (or yours) used for reasoning correctly or not? Why is lying wrong?
Crude said...
I was highlighting a flaw with your sophistry. Nothing more.
To do so, you would have to address the actual position, sophistry or not, instead of the positon you falsely claim I hold. In particular, you need to demonstrate that all subjectively held moral positions must be intermediate/relativistic, as opposed to absolute. The axes are independent: you can be objective but still intermediate (for example, natural law says there are times you can take a human life); you can be arbitary but still absolute.
And yet 'what things do' is discovered subjectively.
Unless you can provide an objective verificaiton of the function, it's not a part of science. For example, you can verify that hearts pump blood by removing a heart and noting that the blood no longer flows.
But I'm glad to see you affirm that science is incapable of determining purpose one way or the other.
As you get to know me, you'll see me affirm that many times. I'm surprised you haven't seen it before.
So, you subjectively know that anyone who does act X 'knows that it is wrong', even though the only kind of 'wrong' that exists on your count is that which is subjectively judged to be so?
Not everyone, but many people. There are pedophiles who hate being pedophiles, for example, by their own admission. For that matter, there would be no gay conversion ministries if there were no people who hated being gay. As for those who don't think it is wrong, or those who do but act on it any way, society and I make the immediate subjective determination that it is wrong, and we need to protect children from these people. Some people hide that subjective determinaiton under another fabric, like natural law, but the subjective component is always present. After all, objective processes like science have nothing to say about purposes.
It's not 'sophistry' to highlight what naturally falls out of a position.
A claim is not sufficient, a demonstration is needed.
Not ever law is derived from moral truth, nor is every moral truth enshrined in positive law, but this does not mean the two classes cannot overlap.
Agreed.
is just a hard-wired accident, not an abiding moral principle, and therefore not germane to the moral judgment of torturing infants.
If you believe ther are two types of moral judgments, the objective principle and subjective preference, than I can see why you would make such a distinction. I have no expectation of actually convncing you otherwise.
However, since for me one of the two categories does not exist, and while you could persuade me otherwise I have no expectation that you will, your argument has no force to me. I will continue to make moral judgments on the same basis that I see everyone else making such judgments. You have adopted an edifice to convince yourself that the principles are objective, but in the end they rely on subjective determinations such as purposes. I have no problem with that, because that's all we have. I do object to the pretense it is something more than that, but as I said, I don't expect that objection to lead anywhere.
There were psychologists in the 1970s who condoned pedophilia, but the Church was strongly against these practices, and they were never mainstream. Further, the fault assigned to the Church is not about the problems of the priests per se, but that the response to such priests was move them from parish to parish when difficulties arose, oftentimes without notifying anyone in the new parish of the issue.
The relevance of those facts to the Church's behavior is that some decisions about handling cases of reported clerical abuse were complicated by prudential considerations of contemporary psychiatry at the time.
So, Church officials bought into the notion that pedophilia did not harm the children?
You know what would convince me of that? A link describing how priests were regularly thrown out, restricted to adult contact, or whatever in the 1950s, but that this behavior changed in the 1970s. Since the 1970s culture is the supposed cause, the behaqvior must have been different before that, right?
IOW, you presuppose a strong view of the objective purpose and moral parameters of human reasoning.
I agree with that phrase, minus the word "objective". I do indeed presuppose a strong view of the purpose and moral parameters of human reasoning.
Am I (are you) obliged to follow the truth where it leads?
Many people do not follow the truth where it leads. I choose to. I think that either follows whether such truths are objective or not.
Is my mind (or yours) used for reasoning correctly or not?
When we reason according to the rules we lay out, we reason correctly. I think correct reasoning is absolutely a good usage of the mind.
Why is lying wrong?
I would probably give much the same answer as you, that communication of the truth is good.
To do so, you would have to address the actual position, sophistry or not, instead of the positon you falsely claim I hold. In particular, you need to demonstrate that all subjectively held moral positions must be intermediate/relativistic, as opposed to absolute.
What I need to do is point out that if morality ultimately derives from subjective decisions, then... morality ultimately derives from subjective decisions. The problem is built into the very position itself, not some particular extrapolation.
Not everyone, but many people.
"Many people" ain't "universal". And even if you came up with something "universally held subjectively", you'd need to show that said view held necessarily - not only in the recently interesting sense of 'They could not have failed to otherwise hold that view', but 'And no person could fail to hold that view, ever.'
There are pedophiles who hate being pedophiles, for example, by their own admission.
And people never lie?
As for those who don't think it is wrong, or those who do but act on it any way, society and I make the immediate subjective determination that it is wrong, and we need to protect children from these people.
No, you make the immediate determination that you don't like that at the moment. There is no "wrong" on your view, or at least "wrong" equals exactly what I said. It's like my calling a person who likes stewed tomatoes "immoral". It's apt, so long as "immoral" means "takes pleasure from something I dislike, rather than is wrong according to some actual objective standard".
After all, objective processes like science have nothing to say about purposes.
Nothing to say, one way or the other, due to the limitations of science - not objectivity, or reason. And science is not some purely "objective process" - it's quite filled with subjectivity, from the observations themselves to the theory formation to even the defining of what does or does not count as 'science'.
A claim is not sufficient, a demonstration is needed.
And a highlighted flaw is still highlighted even when something like this is repeated. When all morality is subjective, and the very idea of any objective or ultimate standard is discarded, then - surprise - morality is subjective. A matter of at-the-moment taste and inclination, and forever shall it be.
Crude said...
What I need to do is point out that if morality ultimately derives from subjective decisions, then... morality ultimately derives from subjective decisions. The problem is built into the very position itself, not some particular extrapolation.
So, you acknowledge the existence of subjective, absolute moral positions? Because below, you indicate otherwise.
"Many people" ain't "universal".
Which is why I have not claimed that everyone who does wrong knows that it is wrong.
... you'd need to show that said view held necessarily ...
It looks like you expect me to demonstrate some position I have not held.
And people never lie?
Sure, people lie. Are you saying, in particular, that every pedophile who acknowledges pedophilia is wrong is lying about it? If not, what is the point of your question here?
No, you make the immediate determination that you don't like that at the moment.
You mean, I someday will approve of pedophilia? Someday society will approve?
It's apt, so long as "immoral" means "takes pleasure from something I dislike, rather than is wrong according to some actual objective standard".
Since an objective moral standard is an oxymoron, I prefer a usage of the word "moral" that means something.
Nothing to say, one way or the other, due to the limitations of science - not objectivity, or reason.
Reason depends upon the subjective choices of the initial premises from which the reasoning is conducted. You can not build an objective house on a subjective framework.
And science is not some purely "objective process"
Agreed.
... morality is subjective. A matter of at-the-moment taste and inclination...
You still need to justify why the first description implies the second.
So, you acknowledge the existence of subjective, absolute moral positions? Because below, you indicate otherwise.
"Absolute"? No. Not even "moral positions". It's like talking about "sin" in an atheistic, materialistic universe. It becomes a nonsense word, a thing used because it sounds good, not because it has meaning.
I acknowledge the existence of people liking some things and disliking others at a particular moment, re: subjectivity.
Which is why I have not claimed that everyone who does wrong knows that it is wrong.
Then you must have had a moment of confusion when you talked about such being "universal".
Sure, people lie. Are you saying, in particular, that every pedophile who acknowledges pedophilia is wrong is lying about it? If not, what is the point of your question here?
You're the one who asked if subjective determinations can be universal (and if so much as one person lies, universal it ain't). I pointed out if they were universal, there'd be no need for laws. Now you're apparently saying, oops, no, well they're not universal but... ???
You mean, I someday will approve of pedophilia? Someday society will approve?
Entirely possible. We're moving in that direction now, in fact. What, you think there's some built-in teleology to evolution (societal, biological, etc) that guarantees certain and particular moral positions will eventually be arrived at, permanently?
If so, ya gots an interesting God there. Can I get a pamphlet and a relic?
Since an objective moral standard is an oxymoron, I prefer a usage of the word "moral" that means something.
If you want morality to mean something, you probably shouldn't be diving for "subjective" morality. ;)
Reason depends upon the subjective choices of the initial premises from which the reasoning is conducted. You can not build an objective house on a subjective framework.
Would someone who wants to justify pedophilia be open to that reasoning?
You still need to justify why the first description implies the second.
I need to justify why saying a house is green means that a house isn't red? Subjective "morality" is subjective. That rather sums it up.
I need to justify why saying a house is green means that a house isn't red? Subjective "morality" is subjective. That rather sums it up.
You seem to be confusing subjective with arbitrary. For example, qualia are subjective, but not arbitrary. A blue quale in my head looks the same today as yesterday (not arbitrary), but it is still entirely in my head (subjective).
I don't like arguing by dictionary, but if we can't agree on what words mean, we'll just talk past each other. So, are you truly claiming that all phenomena that occur in the mind, such as qualia, are "A matter of at-the-moment taste and inclination,"?
It becomes a nonsense word, a thing used because it sounds good, not because it has meaning.
I accept this is how you feel about the matter. I know others seem to use morality without relying on objective standards. Objectivity is not a part of the dictionary definition, either.
If you have a reasonable, substitute word you care to offer for the equivalent of what you call morality, based on subjective notions, I can use that word as well.
Then you must have had a moment of confusion when you talked about such being "universal".
Carelessness, certainly. You'll note that the first time I used the term, I said "near-universal". I subsequently was more careless, and I apologize for that confusion.
You're the one who asked if subjective determinations can be universal (and if so much as one person lies, universal it ain't).
What does this have to do with people knowing what they are doing is wrong? I'm not saying every pedophile so believes, but some seem to.
Entirely possible.
I disagree. I have never, adn will never, consider pedophilic activity to be moral.
We're moving in that direction now, in fact.
Evidence? Attempts to mainstream pedophilia were over by the 1980s, for all but a fringe.
What, you think there's some built-in teleology to evolution (societal, biological, etc) that guarantees certain and particular moral positions will eventually be arrived at, permanently?
No teleology. However, any changes to the empathy we possess, as humans, would be need to be so major that, should our descendants lack it in such large degree, they would no longer be us.
Would someone who wants to justify pedophilia be open to that reasoning?
People who seek to justify things are usually open to any reasoning that could potentially support them, no matter how tenuous. I'm not sure otherwise why your question is relevant.
You seem to be confusing subjective with arbitrary. For example, qualia are subjective, but not arbitrary. A blue quale in my head looks the same today as yesterday (not arbitrary), but it is still entirely in my head (subjective).
No, I'm taking subjective as meaning subjective. And whether a blue quale is 'entirely in your head' is another question.
So, are you truly claiming that all phenomena that occur in the mind, such as qualia, are "A matter of at-the-moment taste and inclination,"?
People don't decide on or change their quales. Their dispositions and morals? That's another thing. Try to see red as blue - lemme know how that works out for ya. See a circle as a square while yer at it.
I accept this is how you feel about the matter. I know others seem to use morality without relying on objective standards. Objectivity is not a part of the dictionary definition, either.
Oh gosh, isn't it? That's devastating!
If you have a reasonable, substitute word you care to offer for the equivalent of what you call morality, based on subjective notions, I can use that word as well.
"Arbitrary expressions of taste."
What does this have to do with people knowing what they are doing is wrong? I'm not saying every pedophile so believes, but some seem to.
And some don't.
I disagree. I have never, adn will never, consider pedophilic activity to be moral.
Great statement about your personal psychology, but uninteresting to me.
Evidence? Attempts to mainstream pedophilia were over by the 1980s, for all but a fringe.
And yet the sexualization of the young continues, and the fact that the attempt was mounted then should be telling for you. Let me guess 'Oh, it didn't work in the 1980s, so it will never be attempted again - and if it is, it will never succeed?' Again, interesting religion you got there.
No teleology. However, any changes to the empathy we possess, as humans, would be need to be so major that, should our descendants lack it in such large degree, they would no longer be us.
Gosh, it's a good thing you don't believe in natural forces capable of altering people's physical, mental and cultural makeup. And yes, we're very empathic creatures. Killing children could never be found in, say.. our fairly recent cultural history, eh?
You live in a fascinating world. Teleological, yet unrealistic.
People who seek to justify things are usually open to any reasoning that could potentially support them, no matter how tenuous. I'm not sure otherwise why your question is relevant.
Oh, I think you may see its relevance after all.
Crude said...
No, I'm taking subjective as meaning subjective.
Since the word has nothing to do with being a matter of taste, hopefully you will drop the conflation.
And whether a blue quale is 'entirely in your head' is another question.
Where else would it be? It needs to be in a location that still allows for color-blindness, for example.
People don't decide on or change their quales.
My point exactly.
Their dispositions and morals? That's another thing.
Who changes their morals arbitrarily?
Try to see red as blue - lemme know how that works out for ya.
Exactly. If you are red-green color-blind, you'll subjectively see a red object as being gray, with a different quale than a person who is not color-blind, but you don't have a choice in the quale anymore than the person who is not color-blind does. The quale is subjective, but not arbitrary.
"Arbitrary expressions of taste."
How about for a subjective, non-arbitrary version?
And some don't.
So, we agree some people do things they know are wrong. Good.
... if it is, it will never succeed?'
Never is a long time.
Gosh, it's a good thing you don't believe in natural forces capable of altering people's physical, mental and cultural makeup.
You're suggesting there's a better alternative?
And yes, we're very empathic creatures. Killing children could never be found in, say.. our fairly recent cultural history, eh?
Killing children is very easy when you declare them to be "objectively" inferior, using "objective" standards to set them apart.
Teleological, yet unrealistic.
Who would be driving the teleology you see in my world?
Oh, I think you may see its relevance after all.
To this discussion? Not really. would you be so kind as to explain?
Gentlemen, I'm afraid I'm going to have to ask you to crank up the snarkiness and non sequiturs here, for this is an intolerably civil discussion to be taking place on my blog, much less online!
jk
One Brow:
You are right to want to get our terms straight, even if it means citing (gasp!) the dictionary. The "dictionary definition" link you provided defines morality as being in accord with standards of right conduct. I will modify the definition to say: "Morality is rightness of human conduct" / "Morality comprises the standards of right human conduct." Acceptable?
Two questions:
1a. Do you believe there are any intrinsic principles of "right human conduct"?
1b. Do you believe there are any irreducible goods qua ends in right human conduct?
I also want to run an analogy by you:
A. "Morality occurs among rational subjects, therefore all morality is subjective. It can't be 'objective', since objects aren't rational."
B. "Reality occurs among language users, therefore all reality is linguistic. Reality can't be objective since objects say, or 'disclose', nothing."
Do you accept both A and B?
Lastly, though it hasn't come up in a while, I think we should call a moratorium on invoking "sophistry". As I explained to him, I voiced provisional concern over One Brow's "stink" of sophistry but I take his, and Crude's, sincerity and integrity at face value. Sophistry is, in at least one sense, the vain desire that "the argument must go on," simply for the thrill of disputation. I think since we are all trying to get at the truth here, or at least to understand our mutually non-negotiable positions, we're not being sophists.
Now, the argument must go on!
I sincerely apologize for not helping you meet your quota of snark.
Codgitator (Cadgertator) said...
I will modify the definition to say: "Morality is rightness of human conduct" / "Morality comprises the standards of right human conduct." Acceptable?
Provisionally, as long as we don't try to sneak "objective" in through the back door of "rightness" or "standards".
Two questions:
1a. Do you believe there are any intrinsic principles of "right human conduct"?
If by "intrinsic", you mean "that arises from being human, before there is social conditioning", then yes, I think when have some very basic principles that seem to be intrinsic to most people, and many of them are even present in most mammals.
1b. Do you believe there are any irreducible goods qua ends in right human conduct?
I'm not sure what you mean by "irreducible" here. Also, are you asking if they are my beliefs, or that I believe they exist even when there are no people to accept them?
I also want to run an analogy by you:
A. "Morality occurs among rational subjects, therefore all morality is subjective. It can't be 'objective', since objects aren't rational."
B. "Reality occurs among language users, therefore all reality is linguistic. Reality can't be objective since objects say, or 'disclose', nothing."
Do you accept both A and B?
While discussions of reality only occur among language users, it would seem that even bacteria experience reality itself. Given that, can a discussion of reality be objective? Reality seems to me to have some features that are objective (objects have dimension, mass, color) and some that are subjective (objects can seem to have organizations, groups of objects can seem to fall in a pattern). So, a discussion of the objective could be objective.
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