A is to-B-continued…

Quick recap:

I presented an analogy-chain about causation and agency relations across different ontological levels.

Then a reader, Fr. Greg, worried where agape and koinonia fit into my analogy-series.

I answered that, since God's will is the personal cause of all things, and that the only basis for His willing the existence of anything, is in order to impart good to it (viz., to love it), then agape is clearly fundamental to Thomism, which seemed fine with Fr. Greg, even though

"it [had] immediately struck [him] that agape and koinonia did not appear in [my] analogical chain, and [he's] wondering if this has anything to do with the gap between Eastern Christianity and that of the West in that, for the former, both [agape and koinonia] are clearly ontological categories even if they were not for Aristotle."

I then asked him to elaborate on this point.

He replied thus:

"What I’m thinking of primarily is Zizioulas’ “Being as Communion”[1] in which, given the eternity of the Trinity, primordial, uncreated being - God - is presented as inherently communal, and therefore, agapic. … My concern is that on this account, agape, koinonia, and yes, perichoresis seem to be, at best, subsumed under the “intellectual” or “contemplative,” whether human or divine. Perhaps, given Aristotlean [sic] and Aquinian/scholastic use of these terms, this is legitimate, but if that is the case, then the denotations of these words need to be clarified in our contemporary context, where they have taken on perhaps more restrictive meanings than what they connote when used by Aquinas or Aristotle."

In response (after a helpful little proviso from Dr. Liccione), I said:

"My analogy is meant only as a dusting off of a pretty ancient concept––the great chain of being––in slightly more analytical terms in order to explore, mainly, the problem of causation “across” ontological levels. In no way should the “intellectualist” flavor of my analogy-series be construed as an exhaustive account of God’s triunity in se or mercy to us in Christ. At most, my line of thought intends to help us grasp just HOW God can and does interact with the world, and this, by viewing His agency-relation to us and the world as a supereminent analogy for how we interact with a world so radically different from us (atoms, molecules, bricks, etc.). It’s what the Scholastics called (cf. section III) the via causalitatis advancing to the via eminentia, with the proviso, à la the 4th Lateran Council, of via remotio, namely, that “between the Creator and the creature there cannot be a likeness so great that the unlikeness is not greater [semper maior dissimilitudo in tanta similitudine].” Hence, fear not, the agapic nature of God as a perichoresis of total open, given koinonia is absolutely prior, in faith, to the tinkering I’m doing about the power of God as man might grasp it by reason."

In any case, Fr. Greg is right that "the denotations of these words [esp. intellectual] need to be clarified in our contemporary context, where they have taken on perhaps more restrictive meanings than what they connote when used by Aquinas or Aristotle."

So let me explain, briefly, what I mean by "intellectual" in my analogy.

The intellect is the immaterial principle of the human soul that allows humans to "grasp" universals in the midst of particular sensibles (e.g., grasping "triangularity" despite having seen numerous different kinds of triangles). The power of the intellect lies in its ability to correlate immaterial concepts, as opposed to sensible percepts, into a coherent intellectual idea, which is the basis for rational reflection and decision. It has little to do with being "all brain" or being "bookish" or "impersonal"––all terms which Fr. Greg, an Eastern-rite Catholic priest, seems to fear diminish God's agapic nature in favor of His power as withdrawn observer.

In the words of St. Thomas:

[S]ince Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.
–– ST Ia, q. 79, a. 3, resp.

[Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia; formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu. Nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu. Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus. Et haec est necessitas ponendi intellectum agentem.]

[A]bove the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding…. [W]e must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms [i.e., mental images; cf. ST Ia, q. 79, a. 4, ad 4]. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. … But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (90, 3; I-II, 3, 7). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Psalm 4:7, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."
–– ST Ia, q. 79, a. 4, resp.

[…considerandum est quod supra animam intellectivam humanam necesse est ponere aliquem superiorem intellectum, a quo anima virtutem intelligendi obtineat. Semper enim quod participat aliquid, et quod est mobile, et quod est imperfectum, praeexigit ante se aliquid quod est per essentiam suam tale, et quod est immobile et perfectum. Anima autem humana intellectiva dicitur per participationem intellectualis virtutis, cuius signum est, quod non tota est intellectiva, sed secundum aliquam sui partem. Pertingit etiam ad intelligentiam veritatis cum quodam discursu et motu, arguendo. Habet etiam imperfectam intelligentiam, tum quia non omnia intelligit…. Unde oportet dicere quod in ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare. Et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia. … Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur, ut infra patebit. Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat, secundum illud Psalmi IV, signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine.]

Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood––namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.
–– ST Ia, q. 79, a. 8, resp.

[…ratio et intellectus in homine non possunt esse diversae potentiae. Quod manifeste cognoscitur, si utriusque actus consideretur. Intelligere enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere. Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam. Et ideo Angeli, qui perfecte possident, secundum modum suae naturae, cognitionem intelligibilis veritatis, non habent necesse procedere de uno ad aliud; sed simpliciter et absque discursu veritatem rerum apprehendunt, ut Dionysius dicit, VII cap. de Div. Nom. Homines autem ad intelligibilem veritatem cognoscendam perveniunt, procedendo de uno ad aliud, ut ibidem dicitur, et ideo rationales dicuntur. Patet ergo quod ratiocinari comparatur ad intelligere sicut moveri ad quiescere, vel acquirere ad habere, quorum unum est perfecti, aliud autem imperfecti. Et quia motus semper ab immobili procedit, et ad aliquid quietum terminatur; inde est quod ratiocinatio humana, secundum viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, procedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus, in via iudicii, resolvendo redit ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat. Manifestum est autem quod quiescere et moveri non reducuntur ad diversas potentias, sed ad unam et eandem, etiam in naturalibus rebus, quia per eandem naturam aliquid movetur ad locum, et quiescit in loco. Multo ergo magis per eandem potentiam intelligimus et ratiocinamur. Et sic patet quod in homine eadem potentia est ratio et intellectus.]

I have written more than once on this topic, so I leave it to the reader to go back over those posts, or read them for the first time. I have added ** to those posts I think most edifying or apt for this line of thought:

**1. "Take a long slip of paper…"

2. "Robo-Survey"

**3. "Brain, Mind and Computers"

4. "River in the River"

5. "Lower the Bar"

6. "No-brainer"

7. "D. Melser on Thought"

**8. "Reimers on the Soul"

**9. "Goodly Chain of Being"

**10. "Scientists prove…?"

**11. "What's the matter?"

[1] I posted a brief review of Zizioulas's splendid book some time ago at FCA, if you're interested.

More'on "A is to B as…"

At Philosophia Perennis, it was asked, "So where do agape and koinonia fit into this scheme?"

Respondeo dicendum quod those forms of love fit into their proper levels of agency, namely, that which exists for humans and their collective relations to God. Those forms of love do not “fit” into the material, physical, or even corporeal levels, but only in the mental, intellectual, and divine levels.

Consider ST Ia, q. 20, a. 2:

…God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (Question 19, Article 4) that God’s will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists.

[…Deus omnia existentia amat. Nam omnia existentia, inquantum sunt, bona sunt, ipsum enim esse cuiuslibet rei quoddam bonum est, et similiter quaelibet perfectio ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum et sic oportet quod intantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, inquantum est volitum a Deo. Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum. Unde, cum amare nil aliud sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat.]

In tandem, ST Ia, q. 19, a. 4, to which St. Thomas just alluded in the above quotation:

We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.

[Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem naturae, ut quidam existimaverunt.]

God’s will to bring things and people into existence is an act of personal love for them as both sharers in His being (a form of transcendent, analogous koinonia) and as absolute subjects of His grace (total agape). Least, ’tis 'ow I see’t.

I would also like to add another reference (ST Ia, q. 76, a. 1) to this train of thought, and one which beautifully ties in with what I am getting at:

But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect.

[Sed considerandum est quod, quanto forma est nobilior, tanto magis dominatur materiae corporali, et minus ei immergitur, et magis sua operatione vel virtute excedit eam. Unde videmus quod forma mixti corporis habet aliquam operationem quae non causatur ex qualitatibus elementaribus. Et quanto magis proceditur in nobilitate formarum, tanto magis invenitur virtus formae materiam elementarem excedere, sicut anima vegetabilis plus quam forma metalli, et anima sensibilis plus quam anima vegetabilis. Anima autem humana est ultima in nobilitate formarum. Unde intantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem, quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo communicat materia corporalis. Et haec virtus dicitur intellectus.]

Wisdom from…

GREGORY OF ELVIRA (357–392): Nature and Resurrection

Look at how for our consolation the whole of nature rehearses the future resurrection. The sun sets and then is born again; the stars disappear and then return; the flowers die and come to life again. So it will be with our bodies of the dead in their graves. As trees hide their greenery in winter and display their withered branches, so all things that die are preserved and raised to life again. Much more then is this true of human beings, who were given mastery over everything that dies, so that they might have mastery also over everything that rises to new life. This is why the Son of God clothed himself in human nature and raised it from the dead.

Therefore, since the resurrection of the body is certain, and since punishment awaits the faithless while the faithful have the promise and hope of a heavenly kingdom, it remains for us to devote ourselves to good works and persevere in all holiness, faith, and uprightness, so that we may rise not to punishment but to glory.
(Treatise on Holy Scripture: PLS 1, 458-459.)

Gregory fought against Arianism and defended the Nicene Creed in action and in writing. He was an exegete who wrote principally on the Old Testament.

ST. AUGUSTINE: Sing with Human Reason

Dear friends, sing the Psalm with human reason, not like birds. Thrushes, parrots, ravens, magpies, and the like are often taught to say what they do not understand. However, to know what we are saying was granted by God's will to human nature. Hence, we who have learned in the Church to sing God's words should be eager to do so. We should know and see with a clear mind what we have all sung together with one voice.
-- Commentary on Psalm 18, 2

Prayer. Give me strength to seek you, Lord, for you have already enabled me to find you and have given me hope of finding you ever more fully.
-- The Trinity 15, 51

ST. FRANCIS DE SALES:

Do you want to know if you profit by the receptions of the sacraments? You will know how you are advancing in the virtue that is proper to a sacrament, for example, if from your confession you obtain the love of your abjection and humility; you will then be able to gauge your progress. Again, if by means of Holy Communion you become more gentle and understanding––since this sacrament is all honey––then you will obtain the fruit of it. But if, on the contrary, you do not become more humble and more gentle, you deserve to be deprived of bread because you do not want to work.
(Spiritual Treatises XVIII; O. VI, pp. 343-344)

G. K. CHESTERTON:

THERE was until lately a law forbidding a man to marry his deceased wife's sister; yet the thing happened constantly. There was no law forbidding a man to marry his deceased wife's scullery-maid; yet it did not happen nearly so often. It did not happen because the marriage market is managed in the spirit and by the authority of women.
('What's Wrong with the World.')

Noli timere…

"…behold, an angel of the Lord appeared to him in a dream, saying, 'Joseph, son of David, do not fear to take Mary your wife, for that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Spirit; she will bear a son, and you shall call his name Jesus, for he will save his people from their sins.'"

"…ecce angelus Domini apparuit in somnis ei, dicens: 'Joseph, fili David, noli timere accipere Mariam conjugem tuam: quod enim in ea natum est, de Spiritu Sancto est. Pariet autem filium: et vocabis nomen ejus Jesum: ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum a peccatis eorum.'" (Mth 1:20ff.)

Today is the feast of the Nativity. While reading the Scriptures for the day, I was struck by two things. First, St. Joseph may rightly be considered the first "evangelized", or at least certainly the second historical, disciple of the Incarnate God. Second, the angel Gabriel's words to him are not only spoken to him, but to all disciples of the Messiah. These points are so closely united in praxis that I might even call them aspects of the same truth.

The first point indicates how we ought to respond to the "icon" of Christ born(e) in Mary. In so far as Mary is the icon of the Church, and the Church the celestial icon of Mary, she is not as properly regarded as a "disciple" of the Lord, as a uniquely favored handmaiden of the Lord, the Kecharitomene, the all-graced Seat of Wisdom, the untouchable and undefiled Ark of the New Covenant. If anything, we should call her a "first-order" disciple, and one whose relationship with the Lord is integrated into any robust "second-order" discipleship. Thus, it is actually in St. Joseph's response to this "ecclesial icon"––the Anointed One in the Blessed Virgin––that we find our own holy response as second-order disciples. Virtually the entire 'economic' life of a Christian is compressed into St. Joseph's vocation: courage, hope, action, and passing the Good News on to others. "You shall call his name Jesus, for he will save!" Indeed: all Christians shall call the Savior Jesus.

Thus, taking St. Joseph as a model for discipleship and virile devotion to the will of God, we are entitled to a share of the knowledge and courage he gained from the angel's message. We are, with the ears of St. Joseph, told not to fear; we are told to dare taking Mary––the womb in which the Son of God assumed flesh and blood, just as the altar of any Catholic church is a womb 'on' which the Son of God assumes the appearance of bread and wine to offer His flesh. We are, in his wake, told to rise and be united with the holy Virgin, not declining to call her our own Bride as the Bride of God. This is how we must behold the Church: as betrothed Virgin, an object of holy devotion, and not as an object of fear or as an obstacle to loving God.

This "second-order primacy" is, I suspect, intimately connected with why the Church reveres St. Joseph as the patron saint of the whole Church. I quote the following from Pope John Paul II's Apostolic Exhortation, Redemptoris Custos:

At a difficult time in the Church's history, Pope Pius IX, wishing to place her under the powerful patronage of the holy patriarch Joseph, declared him "Patron of the Catholic Church."(42 [Cf. Sacror. Rituum Congreg., Decr. Quemadmodum Deus (December 8, 1870)]) For Pius IX this was no idle gesture, since by virtue of the sublime dignity which God has granted to his most faithful servant Joseph, "the Church, after the Blessed Virgin, his spouse, has always held him in great honor and showered him with praise, having recourse to him amid tribulations."(43 [Ibid.]) [emphasis added]

What are the reasons for such great confidence? Leo XIII explained it in this way:

"The reasons why St. Joseph must be considered the special patron of the Church, and the Church in turn draws exceeding hope from his care and patronage, chiefly arise from his having been the husband of Mary and the presumed father of Jesus..., Joseph was in his day the lawful and natural guardian, head and defender of the Holy Family.... It is thus fitting and most worthy of Joseph's dignity that, in the same way that he once kept unceasing holy watch over the family of Nazareth, so now does he protect and defend with his heavenly patronage the Church of Christ."(44 [Encyclical Epistle Quamquam pluries (August 15, 1889)])

I find the words of Pope Pius IX, in Quemadmodum Deus, especially apt:

Him whom countless kings and prophets had desired to see, Joseph not only saw but conversed with, and embraced in paternal affection, and kissed. He most diligently reared Him whom the faithful were to receive as the bread that came down from heaven whereby they might obtain eternal life. (emphasis added)

Lest we forget, the reason we should have courage is for right action. Surely the protector of the Savior and, in time, the co-patron of His Church, did not lack the virtue of courage. Hence:

"When Joseph woke from sleep, he did as the angel of the Lord commanded him; he took his wife…."

"Exsurgens autem Joseph a somno, fecit sicut præcepit ei angelus Domini, et accepit conjugem suam." (Mth 1:24)

Arise! Noli timere!

Not in vain…

For, not in vain did God set the light of reason in the human mind….

No en vano imprimió Dios en la mente humana la luz de la razón….

Infatti non inutilmente Iddio accese nella mente umana il lume della ragione….

Ce n'est pas vainement que Dieu a fait luire dans l'esprit humain la lumière de la raison….

Denn nicht umsonst hat Gott das Licht der Vernunft dem menschlichen Geiste eingepflanzt….

Pope Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, §2

A is to B as…

The material (as sheer undifferentiated causal space) is to the physical (or, corporeal) as the physical is to the sensible.

The sensible is to the mental (i.e., as the realm of percepts) as the mental is to the intellectual (i.e., as the realm of concepts).

The intellectual is to the mental as the divine is to the intellectual.

If any of these ontological “planes” or “spheres” can and do interact, then the forms of interaction we (think we) understand better (e.g., the neural basis of mentation, the physical basis of motion, etc.) can illuminate the other forms of interaction in appropriately analogous ways. If, for example, intellectual thought can somehow meaningfully depend on and causally relate to mental operations, without however being sufficiently produced by or causally “subjugated” to them, then perhaps divine action becomes more lucid as depending on and being causally connected to human existence, without being caused or limited by it.

Does intellectual action, on the whole, have any meaning apart from mental operations? Likewise, I ask, does divine “action” have any meaning apart from human operations? I suspect both human intellectual power and divine power have a real vitality ad intra, which is free from any powers activated ad extra, the former as a supra-mental contemplation of God, the latter as a supra-economical contemplation of the divine Persons.

P.S. It may be more illuminating (or perhaps just as bemusingly unilluminating, in a different way) to read the chain of analogy backwards: the divine is to the intellectual as the intellectual is to the mental; the mental is to the sensible as the sensible is to the physical; and the sensible is to the physical as the physical is to the material. Perhaps, then, the physical is to the material, in a strangely analogous way, as the God is to the world: as Pure Form-Act to pure material-potency.

I do not intend to suggest that the divine level of agency and insight it less “detailed” than a lower level; rather, that, because it is the most “general”, it is therefore the least “specific”; and that its utter generality enables it to encompass every detail in one transcendent formal act of love and "beholding". Because God’s knowledge of the world holds super-generally, it is true in every detail on every lower level of being.

A key premise in this “chain of being” is that the world is indeed real, but that its reality can be diversely and analogously manifested. The pure potentiality of the material is real only insofar as it stands in potency to the real physical determinations that influence it downwards. Likewise, the corporeal/sensible world we really know, is that which grounds the realness of the physical world as the world we can explore; objects are formally "superior" to the sheer flux of atomic physical reality. We don’t create the sensible world from physical nonreality; rather, we use the corporeal level in order to know and manipulate the physical (as in fires, chemical reactions, hydrogen bombs, etc.). Also, while our mental-theoretical constructions about the physical and corporeal world(s) are real (qua entia rationes), they are only real quatenis as they are informed by an intellectual (i.e., higher than mental) ordering of them in relation to the divine light that illuminates our intellects from above. Just as the intellect, via concepts, is the formal "master" of the mental percepts, so God is the super-formal "master" of all intellectual truth.

I don’t deny the reality of any level––I am not a constructivist––, but I am trying to work towards an insight of how one level’s impact on another, or relation to another, can shed light on other levels of being and agency. I suppose my chain could be read as a series of implicit analogies: the lower level stands in relation to the higher level as matter does to form, and, correspondingly, the higher level stands to the lower as form does to matter. Further, the form of agency (qua action) which a higher level can enact upon a lower level, will manifest either “filling in” privations in that lower level, or rearranging lower objects’ relations to that agency and its “co-ontic” neighbor-entities.

“Notice, also, that the proximate cause is the same as the posterior cause and that the remote cause is the same as the prior cause. Hence these two divisions of causes into prior and posterior, remote and proximate signify the same thing. Moreover, it must be observed that that which is more universal is always called the remote cause, but that which is more particular is called the proximate cause. For example we say that the proximate form of man is his definition, namely, rational animal; but animal is more remote and substance is still more remote. All superiors are forms of the inferiors. Again, the proximate matter of the statue is bronze, but the remote matter is metal, and the still more remote is body.”
http://www.diafrica.org/kenny/CDtexts/DePrincNaturae.htm

“Sciendum est quod idem est dictu causa propinqua quod causa posterior, et causa remota quod causa prior. Unde istae duae divisiones causarum: alia per prius, alia per posterius; et causarum alia remota, alia propinqua, idem significant. Hoc autem observandum est, quod semper illud quod universalius est, causa remota dicitur, quod autem specialius, causa propinqua: sicut dicimus quod forma hominis propinqua est sua definitio, scilicet animal rationale mortale, sed animal est magis remota, et iterum substantia remotior est. Omnia enim superiora sunt formae inferiorum. Et similiter materia idoli propinqua est cuprum, sed remota est metallum, et iterum remotius corpus.”
De principiis naturae, cap. 5
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/opn.html

I take St. Thomas here to mean that there is a sort of inverse proportionality between a thing’s conceptual remoteness (e.g., body is more remote from a statue than metal is) and its ontological priority (e.g., body as a general class of things is ontologically “superior” to a particular member of that class). It is by way of analogy that I am inclined to see God’s utterly transcendent remoteness from the vagaries of existence sub specie categorialis, as it were, as a possible grounds for His immanent priority over any creature. Just as ‘body’ is transcendentally prior to a body, yet fully immanent and ontological prior to any body, so God is removed on the one hand, yet immanent on the other.

So, I repeat my main thesis: the lower level stands in relation to the higher level as matter does to form, and only formal agency supervenes in a free, creative way to open reality as we know it.

Another reference from the Angelic Doctor I want to add to this, if for no other good than to add it to the stew before it slipped my mind:

“Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.” (ST I.20.2 ad 2).

“…licet creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint nisi in Deo, tamen per hoc quod ab aeterno in Deo fuerunt, ab aeterno Deus cognovit res in propriis naturis: et eadem ratione amavit. Sicut et nos per similitudines rerum, quae in nobis sunt, cognoscimus res in seipsis existentes.”

Again, I cite this to buttress, or perhaps simply coax out, the idea that, just as we transcend the sensible world, and even the mélange of percepts, by an act of immaterial intellection, so God might be seen as transcending the world in an analogous way. What I am hoping to accomplish with this line of thought, is explore how the mystery of divine action in the world can be made more intelligible, less fantastic to skeptics and deists, by way of analogy from the levels of causation they already admit.

In case anyone is still interested, I am getting some of these ideas from Wolfgang Smith’s The Quantum Enigma, esp. his discussion of vertical causation.