What is a man?

A Man: Tell me, what is a man?

Real Science: He is but a small complex… of complex molecular and subatomic interactions dispersed over a nominalistically recognized field which we call "man".

AM: Okay…. Tell me about America.

RS: It is but a large complex of molecular and subatomic interactions dispersed over a nominalistically recognized field of mountains and rivers and civic libraries all of which are known as "America".

AM: Okay…. Tell me about "small" fields.

RS: They are like humans.

AM: Tell me again about large fields.

RS: They are like America.

AM: So… tell me anything about anything.

RS: Not my department.

AM: Tell me, who are "we" in all this?

RS: Again, not my department. But that man over there might know.

Friends shooting the bull…

Men at a round table in a Taiwanese stir fry restaurant. A full basket of beer bottles and a graveyard of cigarette butts perch under the table. Da Ming says to Bei Ge that the other day he saw a cloud evaporate in an instant as it passed over the sun and then reformed on the other side. Bei Ge and everybody else are totally skeptical. Da Ming must have been seeing things. Clouds don't just evaporate and reform like that. But Da Ming insists that is what he saw.

Fortunately an astute cognitive scientist, Xiao Xie, and a physicist, Zhi Hui, are eating at the adjacent table. They hear the dispute and feel obliged to shed some light. Zhi Hui informs them that, it's true, the laws of physics proscribe what Da Ming claims he saw. Xiao Xie, sensing Da Ming's indignation, modifies the story by saying that, even if Da Ming had perceived the prestidigitating cloud, what he saw was merely a neurological confabulation, a "sleight of brain." Da Ming's muscles, Xiao Xie continues, may have reacted to the stimulus of a "disappearing-reappearing cloud," but that's just because his brain had reconfigured perfectly normal sensory stimuli into something odder and then confabulated a memory to account for the unusual neuromuscular response. Zhi Hui indulges Xiao Xie's explanation, since he knows the laws of physics couldn't have allowed for such an anomaly.

I happened to be sitting at another table when I heard all this––no, actually, it's fictional––and here's my worry, or worries. First, the scientific method of physics has no way to proscribe any phenomenon, since nothing in physics is a priori or deductive. As soon as the limits of physics become as autocratic as Zhi Hui, they cease to become properly scientific. Exact physical science (EPS) is always and necessarily provisional. As I have discussed before in numerous posts (e.g. here1, here2, and here3), EPS exists on the horns of a dilemma––as does every vital form of human inquiry––between, let us say, empirical falsifiability and theoretic dominance, between basing its claims solely on the facts and basing its authority on accounting for all facts. The point is that Zhi Hui, and his physics, has no a priori means to know that Da Ming could not have seen what he says he saw. Da Ming's report must become a genuine and novel datum which physics must integrate or reject on its own empirical terms. The same frailty besets popular science articles about, for example, the "impossible physics" of Santa or the X-Men. They are only provisionally impossible, since, were Santa or the X-Men actually to achieve their magnalia rationes, physics would thereby have to be revised. And if EPS is not open to that perennially fundamental revisability, it is not EPS. So, if Da Ming did actually witness what he witnessed, and Zhi Hui's EPS cannot account for it, so much the worse for Zhi Hui's EPS. Insofar as Zhi Hui's EPS cannot integrate Da Ming's datum, EPS is not a complete explanation of known reality, which is where Xiao Xie comes in: because EPS has the hardest time accounting for the contents of subjective realities in the myriad loci of human subjectivity, the surest tactic is to delegitimize those contents altogether. I have discussed this topic most recently here1 and here2.

As for Xiao Xie's account of Da Ming's experience, I think it suffers from a similar but even more fatal flaw. Xiao Xie's basic claim is that, whatever Da Ming says he experienced, it wasn't outside of Da Ming's neuromuscular structure. It was, again, a "sleight of brain." This is the problem, however: if Da Ming's perception of the prestidigitating cloud (P:c) is nothing but a neuro-cognitive confabulation (C:n), then it stands to reason that all his perceptions are confabulations of the same nature. Otherwise, unless Xiao Xie had experienced and analyzed Da Ming's P:c on its own terms, for himself, he would have no reason to reduce P:c to C:n. Unless cognitive science decides to become a priori, like Zhi Hui's ESP, it has no a priori grounds on which to reduce P:c to C:n. Now, let's assume Xiao Xie had only a week earlier completed a series of rigorous experiments about confabulated experience (C:E). So, presumably, he knows whereof he speaks when he deflates Da Ming's P:c. But here is a further problem: because it is undeniable that Da Ming experienced something when he says he experience P:c, we have to ask what he actually experienced. And it seems that Xiao Xie's 'superior' explanation is merely that Da Ming experienced the experience of his brain confabulating the experience of a prestidigitating cloud, which I shall formalize as P:C:n::P:c. His memory of P:c is, therefore, nothing but his memory of P:C:n::P:c. This is an erudite reduction, but what has it actually gained us in explanatory terms? For now, instead of Da Ming's phenomenal dogmatism about P:c, we are left with Xiao Xie's phenomenal dogmatism about P:C:n::P:c. The problem is that, in either case, we are still left with an irreducibly phenomenal content of the story trying to be told. For, while Xiao Xie is effectively saying that Da Ming did not really experience P:c, he did really experience P:C:n::P:c. Thus, in the very act of attempting to reduce the silly phenomenological contents of Da Ming's account to the empirically rigorous, scientifically sober contents of a complex of neural activity in Da Ming's neurological system, Xiao Xie has only replaced the irreducibly phenomenal content of P:c with that of P:C:n::P:c. He has not, therefore, done away with the irreducibility of phenomenal experience as a 'scientific' illusion––he has merely located it. Instead of scolding Da Ming for claiming to see P:c, Xiao Xie commends an unspecified complex of Da Ming's neural tissue for perceiving P:C:n::P:c.

And then there is the ultimate question of what we should make of Xiao Xie's perceptions themselves. For if his own cognitive theories can so easily dispense with Da Ming's account, why don't they dispense with the contents of his own consciousness as well? Presumably, Xiao Xie would say that his deflation can be replicated in a laboratory. But so what? What if Da Ming's experience can only be replicated in a laboratory coextensive with the phenomelogical field in which he first experienced it? Its rarity would not make it any less true than Halley's comet, the emergence of a black hole, or the Big Bang itself. Indeed, the rarity of Da Ming's P:c would ipso facto make it the crucial datum for a higher law than Zhi Hui and Xiao Xie can account for in the their entire lives––but would not therefore make it a fiction. Hence, it may be the case that the authority of Zhi Hui's and Xiao Xie's science rests more on the contingency and provincialism of their field's experience than on reality itself, a reality which was disclosed to Da Ming like Newton's (apocryphal) apple, or Galileo's (apocryphal) weights off the Tower of Pisa, or St Augustine's (all too real) pear-theft epiphany. Therefore, by the end of the night, it is a very open question as to who was shooting more bullshit: Da Ming, Zhi Hui, or Xiao Xie.

Speaking of Taiwan…

…but not in such a depressing vein as last night. Here's a jolly little video about some friends touring Taiwan. I like to call it home. Who needs virtual reality? You! Are! There!

Well, that was immensely depressing…

I saw Formosa Betrayed tonight. And it left me profoundly depressed. I have a feeling the claim that the KMT killed 20,000 people in one day (February 28, 1947) is a bit inflated, but, even so––seeing a movie about how the foundation of Taiwan, the country I've called home for about seven years, was built on a military occupation… and that my own government abetted it all to go on… well, it's just depressing, even if a melodramatic depiction. My only "consolation" is that it just confirms my––our––pilgrim-status on earth. As Hebrews 11 says:

[13]These all died in faith, not having received what was promised, but having seen it and greeted it from afar, and having acknowledged that they were strangers and exiles on the earth.
[14] For people who speak thus make it clear that they are seeking a homeland.
[15] If they had been thinking of that land from which they had gone out, they would have had opportunity to return.
[16] But as it is, they desire a better country, that is, a heavenly one. Therefore God is not ashamed to be called their God, for he has prepared for them a city.

13 這 些 人 都 是 存 著 信 心 死 的 ， 並 沒 有 得 著 所 應 許 的 ； 卻 從 遠 處 望 見 ， 且 歡 喜 迎 接 ， 又 承 認 自 己 在 世 上 是 客 旅 ， 是 寄 居 的 。
14 說 這 樣 話 的 人 是 表 明 自 己 要 找 一 個 家 鄉 。
15 他 們 若 想 念 所 離 開 的 家 鄉 ， 還 有 可 以 回 去 的 機 會 。
16 他 們 卻 羨 慕 一 個 更 美 的 家 鄉 ， 就 是 在 天 上 的 。 所 以 神 被 稱 為 他 們 的 神 ， 並 不 以 為 恥 ， 因 為 他 已 經 給 他 們 預 備 了 一 座 城 。

A few other things are weighing on me as well––some translations and essays I have failed to complete for too long, some echoes of a past I said I would not revisit, general existential angst, etc.––so the movie only added to my transient melancholy. All I want to do is serve at St. Coletta's, study, write, and workout.

Part of the problem with "Taiwan and me" is that, while I "know" I "must" support Taiwan's independence––"democracy" is a demanding buzz word––, I don't have a clear idea of what Taiwanese independence would mean, functionally speaking. If it were granted complete diplomatic autonomy tomorrow, would this necessarily mean life here would get better? What if that just led to more machinations by the PRC to sabotage relations between Taiwan and others? Or to outright war? Or what if it led to a regime that expunged all non-Taiwanese elements and thus led to a culturally anemic and xenophobic island? Presumably, the idea of "freedom" is so noble in its own right that the Taiwanese, like all people, deserve to enjoy it, even if it entails pragmatic difficulties and woes. But that just assumes a lot of classic values which I don't think many advocates of Taiwanese independence are willing to grant in a different context. Specifically, and in a typically metaphysical vein, if determinism is true and "freedom" is an illusion for humans, why should I fight for it on behalf of these agents called nations? Divorced from a robust conception of human freedom as an irreducible good, much of the activism for "independence" boils down to politics and hedonism: "We don't like how Those Guys run things, because they run things, so we want to run things. And we don't like not being able to buy what we want, so we want to get what we want."

Maybe I feel like the protagonist in the movie: having never thought of coming to, or caring about, Taiwan, there came a point when he saw things, lived things, loved things, and lost things which he can never forget. Taiwan is a tainted place for him, like a giant haunted house. Maybe I feel the same way about Taiwan sometimes: having seen, lived, loved, lost––now what does going forward mean? At least Agent Kelly could quit the FBI; I can't quit myself. Like Agent Kelly, I find myself devastated by what I've lived, learned, loved, and lost in this country, and I can only wonder what the road ahead holds. Much to ponder.

Gym routine - August 2010

25 August, 2010
Ur-Workout: 70 mins
89kg, BMI 25

0. Warmup: Exercise bike, ski machine, stretching

1. Bench press:
[Not until my left pec gets better.]

1a. Elbows-out dumbbell tricep extension (total weight): 10, 8, 6 @ 32–40kg

2. Pullup: 12 @ bodyweight

2a. Lever bench row: 10, 8, 6 @ 100-120kg
[I probably need to change this to a 12, 10, 8 rep-scheme and keep the weight from 100–110kg. My form was a little off tonight––I let my chest come off the pad––and, on top of that, I didn't feel as much PUMP as I want to feel when I work my lats! More reps! heheh]

3. Dumbbell military press (total weight): 10, 8, 6 @ 36–54kg

4. Dumbbell curl (total weight): 10, 8, 6 @ 30–45kg
[I tried a new technique with these: grip the handle at the outer head, not in the middle, so there is more space between the blade of your hand and the inner head, and no space between your thumb and the outer head. This accentuates the supinating power of the biceps as opposed to the mere flexing.]

5. Decline leg press: 20, 18, 16, 12 @ 130-180kg
[My foot felt a little achey but otherwise it was great to be able to do the leg press again!]

6. Leg curl: 20, 15, 15, 12 @ 30-45kg
[My hams have definitely gotten stronger. I did 15 reps at 40kg with only socially tolerable grunting on the last few reps. Finishing 12 reps at 45kg, however, was a beautifully raw effort.]

7. Supine French press: 10, 8, 6 @ 25–40kg (?)
[I could really feel the extra challenge I gave my left arm in my last workout. Doubling up on my tris lately has made me sore but I like the challenge.]

8. Standing calf raise: N/A
[Moratorium on calf raises, due to foot injury.]

9. Kneeling rope pulldown (20 + 10 obliques): 30, 30, 32, 32 @ 35-40kg
[I realized today that the reason I have been doing 70kg+ is because the cable machine I was on has lots of pulleys, which inflate the weight. When I went to a straight, single-pulley machine, 40kg felt about the same as my usual 77.5kg, so I'm splitting the difference. This is one of those cases when an "illusion of weight" doesn't annoy me at all: I have felt the soreness in my serrati anterior and abs, and I love the pump during this exercise, so the numbers can take the hindmost.]

10. Wrist curl: N/A
[I'll work wrists on off-days.]

Cooldown: That wacky vibrating machine from the 1950s!
[I read that vibrations actually do help muscle growth (e.g. as claimed here), so it seems like a mini-massage afterwards is a good way to cool down. If nothing else, it's soothing.]

+++
I have to get my intensity up, which means I have to get my time down. Granted, my 70 minutes today included at least 5 minutes of warmup and 5 minutes of cooldown, so that puts me at 60 minutes of actual workout time. I also have to factor in the delay from waiting on other people. Still, I'd like to get my workout to 50 minutes or less, no matter what.

God, Predication, and Ontology

[I originally posted this 4 July 2004 but felt it was worth bringing "back to the future," not only, I hope, to help some readers (?) with the recent material I've written about necessity, possibility, and so on, but also to show how this topic has been abiding interest of mine for longer than I realized. I have bolded the sections that I think have value for further consideration.

I sent a copy of this essay to a former professor of mine UF, Gene Witmer, and he was nice enough to reply, though I can't find, much less, recall the substance of his comments right now. I know he is a rather staunch atheist and physicalist––he joked drolly once about "Saint Alvin"––so even though my writings did little to convert him, I must thank him for giving me my taste for metaphysics. He was a bit rough around the edges but a very good teacher.]

The classic repudiation, à la Kant (AD 1724-1804), of the ontological argument for the existence of God (OAG), à la Anselm of Canterbury (AD 1033-1109) in his famed Proslogium, is that, since existence is not a predicate, necessary existence cannot be predicated of God. Anselm argued that God is the being than which none greater can be conceived, meaning that God is infinitely greater than every other entity. Part of this “maximal greatness" (to use a term of Alvin Plantinga’s in his modification of OAG) includes existing, since any existent being is greater than any nonexistent being.

A common example is that a perfect, but nonexistent, island is inferior to an even slightly less magnificent, but existent, island by sheer virtue of the fact that the latter actually has its magnificence, while the former does not actually have any magnificence. In lay terms, ten real dollars is greater than a billion imaginary ones. An actual bird in hand is better than two potential ones on the roof.

In reference to God, this fairly straightforward observation about the superiority of actuality over potentiality is that, if God is the greatest possible being, then he must exist. The key is to abstractly “depersonalize” God (as we in the Judeo-Christian tradition are inclined to imagine Him) for the moment, for the sake of argument, and call Him instead simply “the greatest possible being.” If we imagine such a maximally great being (MGB) – a term I’ll discuss below – we should admit that part of MGB's greatness entails its existence, since any other being, even one less great, would be ontologically “superior” to MGB by sheer virtue of actually possessing its iota of greatness. No matter how great MGB might be, it is less great than any actually existent thing because there is no MGB to have that greatness. Hence, if we conceive of God as the greatest possible being – and not even the greatest possible mortally imaginable being – then we should admit such a greatest being would have to exist, or it would not eo ipso be the greatest being. A thing’s nonexistence automatically disqualifies it from being the greatest possible being (a.k.a. God).

This sounds reasonable enough, but where Kant finds fault with it – and, in many people’s opinion, irrefutable fault – is that existence is not a predicate, meaning nothing can “have” existence to any greater degree than anything else. Predication basically means description. For example, you can predicate redness to two apples. One apple might be much redder than the other. By some obscure chemical process, you might be able to remove all redness from one of the apples, thus, no longer being able to predicate redness to it. That’s nice for things – predicates – like color, size, temperature, beauty, wisdom, weight and the like; but what about existence? Does it make any sense to predicate being to a thing? How can one thing be "more existent" than another? Existence is a binary feature of ontology: you either have it or you don’t. Existence is also very egalitarian: each existing thing exists just as greatly as any other existent thing. Hence, speaking of comparative degrees of being seems totally fallacious: a thing either is or it isn’t.

The significance of this point for OAG, according to Kant, is that existence shouldn’t even be brought into the consideration of God’s alleged greatness. Since there is no such thing as maximally existing or minimally existing -- but only existence in se -- we should not bother saying an existent thing is greater than a non-existent thing because it exists. We should restrict our criteria of ontological “greatness” to legitimate, variable predicates.

In his well known example [forgive me if I have this confused], Kant proposed two triangles, one existent, the other non-existent. "Adding" existence to the latter in no way increases its greatness over the former. However, removing one of the former’s sides – thus eradicating its triangularity – would indeed place its ontological "rank" below the nonexistent, whole triangle. The point is that this change – removing a side from one of the triangle – alters the triangles' respective predicates. This change has nothing to do with their existence, since existence is not predicable to them, while triangularity is predicable.

As a consequence, God’s putative greatness can be maximalized only in terms of His predicates – goodness, wisdom, power, etc. – but not in terms of His existence. Hence, even if He were conceived of as some “greatest being” – the most perfectly predicated being – that still would not entail His actual existence. A perfect and benevolent God may be better than a wicked Deity in terms of their predicates, but since you couldn’t predicate existence to either, perhaps neither exists. God may be perfect, but He nevertheless may not be. Basically, Kant imprisoned God in the realm of pure abstract possibility, granting even His Maximal Greatness only the possibility of existence.

Now, I am far from an expert on these matters, but I do know there has been some very advanced analytic work on Anselm’s little argument in the past fifty or sixty years. His humble thought experiment, which was conceived in Anselm's mind more as a prayer than a real argument, has died so hard -– or, perhaps more accurately, not died at all -– for some good reason. I understand that Alvin Plantinga’s most important contribution to OAG has been to cast it in terms of possible worlds (PWs).

For the sake of technical clarity, I should mention that Plantinga defines PWs as “maximal states of affairs,” meaning they can possess every possible attribute except being our world, the actual world (AW). Our world, AW, is the only actual state of affairs; everything else is possible. AW exists actually; all PWs exist possibly. There are other states of affairs that could exist, and could be very different from AW. For example, there could be a PW, say, PW’, that is exactly like AW except that in PW’ I have brown eyes instead of blue. Or there could be another PW, say PW’’, that is totally unlike AW, except that PW’’ also has oxygen (and only oxygen) in it. A PW’s relative similarity to AW is not really important. What is important is that, no matter how similar or dissimilar a PW is to AW, none of them actually exists, whereas AW does actually exist. Notice that this stipulation is not a violation of the non-predicability of existence, of which Kant made so much. It’s simply a statement about whether a state of affairs is or is not actual. Both PW’ and PW’’ are merely possible worlds, not the actual (i.e., this) world.

Now, basically – very basically! – Plantinga argues that if there is a possible PW in which some being necessarily exists, then that being necessarily exists in all PWs, including our world, AW. Hence, this alleged necessary being (a.k.a. God), posited in PW1, necessarily exists in this, our actual world. I admit that when I first encountered this idea, it struck me as utterly absurd. So what if some great being exists in some other possible world? Its “possible” existence in some other “possible” world doesn’t make it the case that it really exists in this, the real world. I was baffled, but I also knew Plantinga – and Anselm, and Hartshorne, and many other philosophers sympathetic to OAG – was not a complete idiot. He had to have some good reason for defending the seemingly trivial idea of a possible necessary being.

I have come to realize that Plantinga's good reason is that the nature of a necessary being (NB) is crucial for a fair assessment of OAG. In my very dim understanding, when Plantinga speaks of NB, he means a being that can’t fail to be, a being the essence – or “non-negotiable” attribute – of which is to exist. In purely abstract terms, it simply can’t be the case that NB does not exist. Now, such a being is certainly conceivable. Take a minute and imagine such a being, using only the terms of the definition I just gave; don’t get hung up on how foreign such a being is to our everyday, contingent existence. If you can imagine such a being without immediately recognizing an absolute contradiction in terms – on the order of a round square or 2 + 2 = 5 – then such a being might very well exist in some other, possible state of affairs.

In addition to the necessity of God in OAG, Plantinga discusses the "greatness" of this alleged NB. Plantinga begins by imagining a being that is "maximally excellent," which is to say a being that is totally loving, kind, wise, powerful, just, good, etc. As Graham Oppy says, "an entity possesses 'maximal excellence' iff [if and only if -- EBB] it is omnipotent, omnscient [sic], and morally perfect." A maximally excellent being (MEB) is certainly possible.

Next, MEB can be said to possess “maximal greatness” iff it is maximally excellent in every PW, which is to say it exists necessarily and is necessarily maximally excellent. In other words, MEB is MGB iff it is NB and necessarily MEB. Such a being, too, is certainly possible. We’ve already noted the possibility of NB, the possibility of MEB, and, now the possibility of MGB, so we should now see the consequent necessity of MGB. Since it is possible that MGB exists in some PW, it is necessary that MGB exists in every PW, including AW.

Maybe this seems like a lot of smoke and mirrors. To help clear the air, let’s consider the general nature of logical necessity and possibility. Consider the following proposition (q): 2 + 2 = 4. We immediately, intuitively and undeniably recognize that q is true, and necessarily true, in AW. But how about in some other world, say, non-AW? It should be obvious that q is also just as necessarily true in non-AW as in AW. q is a necessarily true proposition in every possible world. It can’t fail to be the case that 2 + 2 = 4; it’s a sure bet, in AW and in all PWs. By the very terms of the definition, it’s meaningless to rub your chin and say, “Well, perhaps 2 + 2 doesn’t equal 4 in some other world. Anything's possible, right?” Sorry, nope. Whatever is necessary in one state of affairs is the case in every PW; and whatever is the case in every PW is necessary in any state of affairs.

Now let’s consider a second proposition (qq): 2 + 2 = 1. It should be as plainly obvious – and necessarily obvious – that this is nonsense, both in AW and in all PWs. qq is necessarily false, which means it is – or "exists as" – false in every PW. It's as absurd to rub your chin and say, "Well, maybe 2 + 2 really does equal 1 in some other world. Anything's possible, right?" Well, no. You'll lose that bet every time, in every world.

With all this in mind, the important question is this: is God, construed as an NB, possible like q or impossible like qq? If God is like q, then He exists in PW1 just as necessarily as in AW. If, on the other hand, God is like qq, then He cannot exist in PW1 just as necessarily as He can't exist in any other world, including AW. But as we’ve already seen, God, as an NB, is not necessarily impossible; in fact, an NB’s possible existence ensures its existence in every world just as necessarily as q’s necessity ensures its validity in every world.

What is possible is possible in every world. What is possibly necessary in one PW is just as totally necessary as in every PW. More poetically, what is possibly necessary is necessarily possible; and what is necessarily possible is simply necessary. As with q, the very terms of the definition of an NB make it meaningless to rub your chin and say, “Well, perhaps a 'necessary being' could fail to exist in some other sate of affairs.” You might as well say 2 + 2 could equal 1, or that a square could be round. Since God, as an NB, is possible in at least one PW, then He necessarily exists in every PW, including AW. Hence, God necessarily exists in AW.

It should be clear that, in light of PWs, I don’t find Kant’s critique of OAG compelling. I agree that existence is not a predicate; but I disagree that OAG is simply about God’s predicates. OAG, more properly understood, is about various PWs’ predicates. As Kant argued, we shouldn't try to weigh one Being's greatness over another's based on their existence or non-existence. And now, with OAG formulated in terms of PWs, we’re not trying to establish one PW’s greatness over another PW based on either’s existence or non-existence. We’re simply discussing what might “populate” PWs.

Hence, I think Kant’s disregard for God’s predicates misses the point and actually backfires on him. He’s right that we should not judge God’s greatness based on His existence or non-existence. Yet, the predicate under question is not God’s existence, but his necessity or contingency. We’re not debating whether God’s be-ing is more truly existent than any other things’ be-ing. We’re simply discussing his mode, or way, of existing in comparison with other things’ modes of being. And, as I’ve discussed, God’s (conceptualized) status as an NB gives Him the same kind of omni-PW necessity as q or the triangularity of three conjoined sides.

The OAG, then, is not about God’s predicates, but about God’s predicability to various PWs. That difference, I think, dodges Kant’s predication objection to OAG. I could care less whether a possible God is greater than an actual one. What I’m concerned with – and what I think the OAG presses upon us – is whether it’s possible to predicate to a PW the attribute of “having an NB.” Insofar as such PW-predicability is possible, I think OAG provides a powerful defense of God’s existence, in PW and in AW.

AWmen.

P.S. I would appreciate suggestions, critiques, encouragement and any credit card information you might have to offer. Thankee.

P.P.S. I’m suspicious of calling location a predicate. Hence, insofar as I can see God’s possibility in PWs as a reference to His location, I think OAG has even less to do with God’s predicates.